JUDY C. LYNCH & others 
KEITH D. CRAWFORD & others  (and a consolidated case ).
Heard: September 5, 2019.
action commenced in the Superior Court Department on October
action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
February 10, 2016.
consolidation, the case was heard by Paul D. Wilson, J., on
motions for summary judgment, and a motion for
reconsideration was considered by him.
review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court
granted leave to obtain further appellate review.
Christopher G. Clark (Christopher E. Novak also present) for
Keith D. Crawford.
E. Goloboy (Richard B. Reiling also present) for the
Jonathan C. Green, Assistant Attorney General, for the
Attorney General, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.
J. Barter, for Professional Liability Foundation, Ltd.,
amicus curiae, submitted a brief.
Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, &
plaintiffs, former employees of the now-dissolved Roxbury
Comprehensive Community Health Center, Inc. (RoxComp), were
not paid for the work they performed during the weeks before
RoxComp shut its doors. Under the Wage Act, G. L. c. 149,
§ 148, discharged employees are entitled to be paid all
wages due them on the day of their discharge by their
"employers." The "president and treasurer of a
corporation and any officers or agents having the management
of such corporation" are "deemed to be the
employers of the employees of the corporation within the
meaning of [the statute] ." Id. The plaintiffs
brought consolidated civil actions against the defendant
Keith D. Crawford alleging that, as RoxComp's president,
he was among the "employers" who had violated the
Wage Act by failing to pay them the wages they were
due.Crawford moved for summary judgment, claiming
that he was not RoxComp's president but solely the chair
of its board of directors and that, even if he were its
president, he served without compensation and therefore was
immune from suit under the Federal Volunteer Protection Act
(VPA), 42 U.S.C. § 14503(a) (2012), and the State
charitable immunity statute, G. L. c. 231, § 85W (§
Superior Court judge denied Crawford's motion, concluding
that there were disputes of material fact as to whether
Crawford served as president and whether his conduct placed
him outside the scope of the qualified immunity provided to
volunteers under the VPA and § 85W. Crawford filed a
petition pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 118, first par.,
seeking leave from a single justice of the Appeals Court to
pursue an interlocutory appeal from the denial of his motion
for summary judgment. A single justice denied leave to appeal
under § 118 and declared that, if Crawford contended
that he had a right to interlocutory appeal under the
doctrine of present execution, the way to assert that right
was to file a notice of appeal in the Superior Court.
Crawford then timely filed such a notice.
attempt to harmonize two of our opinions applying the
doctrine of present execution -- Maxwell v.
AIG Domestic Claims, Inc., 460 Mass. 91 (2011), and
Marcus v. Newton, 462 Mass. 148
(2012) -- the Appeals Court concluded that "where a
statute designed to encourage private conduct speaks in terms
of providing immunity only from liability, and that statute
places no affirmative obligations on the protected party to
take the actions being immunized, courts are not, without
more, to infer an intent to provide immunity from suit."
Lynch v. Roxbury Comprehensive
Community Health Ctr., Inc., 94 Mass.App.Ct. 528, 535
(2018). Consequently, the Appeals Court held that the
doctrine of present execution did not entitle Crawford to an
interlocutory appeal from the denial of his motion for
summary judgment based on his claimed charitable immunity
under Federal or State law because (1) "[t]he language
of [§ 85W and the VPA] speaks in terms of immunity only
from liability, not from suit"; (2) § 85W
"imposes no obligations on people who serve as volunteer
board members of nonprofit institutions"; and (3) the
VPA does not command "State interlocutory appellate
review when such an appeal otherwise would not be
available." Id. at 535, 537-538. We granted
Crawford's motion for further appellate review.
that, where a statute provides qualified immunity, as do the
VPA and § 85W, we attempt to discern whether the
Legislature intended immunity from suit, rather than simply
immunity from liability. That the statute speaks only of
liability and does not specifically spell out immunity from
suit is not dispositive. Rather, we look to the language of
the entire statute and, where there is ambiguity, apply our
traditional standards of statutory interpretation to
determine whether the Legislature intended to grant immunity
from suit. Having done so here, we conclude that Congress
intended the VPA to provide qualified immunity from suit for
officers in nonprofit organizations who receive no
compensation and that § 85W may only expand the scope of
that immunity, not diminish it. Because our doctrine of
present execution recognizes that interlocutory appeal is
necessary to vindicate the rights of one who is ordered to
proceed to trial despite being immune from suit, we conclude
that Crawford, as a volunteer for a nonprofit organization,
is entitled to interlocutory review of the denial of his
motion for summary judgment.
the merits of that summary judgment motion, we affirm the
judge's denial of the motion, finding that there are
genuine issues of material fact as to whether Crawford was,
in fact, the president of RoxComp and as to whether he
engaged in "any acts or omissions intentionally designed
to harm" that would deprive him of the immunity
otherwise provided by § 85W.
of present execution. a. Immunity from suit.
Generally, a litigant is entitled to appellate review only of
a final judgment, not of an interlocutory ruling, such as the
denial of a motion for summary judgment. See Pollackv.Kelly, 372 Mass. 469, 470-471 (1977).
"However, in narrowly limited circumstances, where
'an interlocutory order will interfere with rights in a
way that cannot be remedied on appeal' from a final
judgment, and where the order is 'collateral to the
underlying dispute in the case' . . ., a party may obtain
full appellate review of an interlocutory order under our
doctrine of present execution." Patelv.Martin, 481 Mass. 29, 32 (2018), quoting
Maddocksv.Ricker, 403 Mass. 592,
596 (1988). "The doctrine is intended to be invoked
narrowly to avoid piecemeal appeals from ...