ILAN I. & another 
MELODY M. 
Heard: September 12, 2019.
action commenced in the Superior Court Department on June 16,
2016. A motion to extend a harassment prevention order was
heard by Cornelius J. Moriarty, II, J.; and the case was
heard by Mark C. Gildea, J.
Margaret A. Ishihara for the defendant.
Jeffrey E. Francis for the plaintiffs.
Present: Vuono, Meade, & Sullivan, JJ.
notice and a hearing, Ilan I. and his husband, Knox K.,
obtained a harassment prevention order against their former
friend and then current neighbor, Melody M. See G. L. c.
258E. The order was extended on two occasions. The defendant
appeals, contending that her due process rights were violated
because the judge did not hold an evidentiary hearing when
the first extension order was issued, and that none of the
orders were supported by sufficient evidence. The plaintiffs
contend, among other things, that the appeal from the first
extension order must be dismissed. We affirm.
plaintiffs filed a three-count complaint in June of 2016,
seeking relief under G. L. c. 258E, and asserting claims for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and trespass. A
judge of the Superior Court issued an ex parte harassment
prevention order on June 16, 2016. Following a hearing after
notice on June 21, 2016, a harassment prevention order issued
for six months, to expire on January 9, 2017. Melody M.
timely appealed from this order, but failed to perfect her
appeal, and it is not before us. After a nonevidentiary
hearing on January 9, 2017, a judge of the Superior Court
(first judge) extended the order for six months, to July 10,
2017 (January, 2017 extension order). Melody M. timely
appealed (first appeal). On September 14, 2017, after an
evidentiary hearing, a second judge again extended the order,
to July 10, 2018, and ordered the entry of a "Judgment
and Order on Complaint for Harassment Prevention Order"
for each plaintiff pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 54 (b), 365
Mass. 820 (1974) (September, 2017 extension orders). Melody
M. timely appealed (second appeal),  and we consolidated
the two appeals.
plaintiffs now claim that Melody M.'s appeal from the
January, 2017 extension order must be dismissed because it
was a premature, interlocutory appeal, and was not preserved
by being included in the second appeal.
case presents a procedural anomaly. In the usual course,
requests for harassment prevention orders are filed as
stand-alone proceedings using complaint forms approved by the
trial court. See G. L. c. 258E, §§ 3, 11. There is
an immediate right to appeal to this court from an order
after notice, and from any extension order. See
O'Brien v. Borowski, 461 Mass. 415, 418 (2012)
(G. L. c. 258E). Cf. Zullo v. Goguen, 423 Mass. 679,
681 (1996) (G. L. c. 2O9A). Certain personal identifying
information is impounded and withheld from public inspection.
Filing fees are waived. See G. L. c. 258E, §§ 3
(c), 10. Other civil or criminal remedies are preserved. See
G. L. c. 258E, § 3 (g) ("An action commenced under
this chapter shall not preclude any other civil or criminal
reasons not apparent in the record, the plaintiffs here did
not follow that procedure, and instead filed a civil
complaint in three counts of which the request for relief
under G. L. c. 258E was but one. The practical effect of the
plaintiffs' choice of pleading in this case was to impede
the defendant's right of immediate appeal once the June,
2016 order after notice and the January, 2017 extension order
had entered.See O'Brien, 461 Mass. at
clarify that, consistent with O'Brien,
supra, a G. L. c. 258E order is immediately
appealable, even where it is joined with other causes of
action in a civil complaint. Cf. Zullo, 423 Mass. at
681 ("Abuse prevention order proceedings were intended
by the Legislature to be as expeditious and informal as
reasonably possible"). For this reason, appeals should
be heard quickly and in a uniform manner. Id. at
681-682. "The policies of providing a '[u]niformity
of treatment of litigants and the development of a consistent
body of law' are equally applicable to" c. 258E
appeals regardless whether the request for an order was made
in a separate proceeding, or in a civil suit. Id. at
682, quoting Department of Revenue v. Jarvenpaa, 404
Mass. 177, 181 (1989). "We see no reason why the avenue
for review of an order made pursuant to G. L. c. [258E]
should turn on the fortuity of [how or] where the plaintiff
initiated the action." Zullo, supra at
681-682. See O'Brien, 461 Mass. at 418.
notices of appeal in this case were properly filed, and the
appeals have been ...