United States District Court, D. Massachusetts
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ALLISON D. BURROUGHS DISTRICT JUDGE
For the
reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES
IN PART the plaintiff's motion to amend [ECF #12]. The
Court also orders that a summons issue for Arthur Tobin and
that Paul Keenan be dismissed as a defendant.
I.
BACKGROUND
On June
24, 2019, pro se litigant John DeNicola filed a
complaint [ECF #1] against Quincy Police Officer Cheryl P.
Potter (“Potter”) and Quincy District Court
Assistance Clerk Magistrate James Comerford
(“Comerford”). Invoking the Court's federal
question jurisdiction, DeNicola represents that his rights
under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth amendments were
violated. DeNicola does not specify whether he is suing these
two individuals in their official or individual capacities.
In an
order dated July 19, 2019 [ECF #5], the Court granted the
plaintiff's in forma pauperis motion and ordered
that summonses issue as to Potter and Comerford. On July 26,
2019, the United States Marshals Service (“USMS”)
received from DeNicola the summonses, copies of the
complaint, and forms for service. The USMS completed service
on Potter and Comerford on July 30, 2019 and August 7, 2019,
respectively [ECF ## 9, 11].
On July
29, 2019, DeNicola filed an amended complaint [ECF #7], as
was his right under Rule 15(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Referring to the First, Fourth, and
Fourteenth amendments, the amended complaint asserts claims
against Potter, Comerford, Quincy District Court Clerk
Magistrate Arthur Tobin (“Tobin”) and Quincy
Police Chief Paul Keenan (“Keenan”). Summonses
have not issued for Tobin and Keenan. The amended complaint
does not indicate whether the claims are brought against the
defendants in their official or individual capacities.
On
August 5, 2019, Potter, through counsel, filed an answer [ECF
# 10] to the original complaint. One of Potter's
affirmative defenses is that “[t]he complaint asserts
claims against Officer Potter in her official capacity only.
Therefore, the proper party defendant is the City of Quincy
and Officer Potter should be dismissed as a defendant.”
Potter Answer. at 2. Presumably in response this affirmative
defense, DeNicola filed a motion [ECF #12] to further amend
his complaint “to include official and individual
capacity” claims. Mot. at 1. DeNicola also notes that
the form he used to draft his complaint does not contain a
field to indicate whether a defendant is being sued in an
official or individual capacity. DeNicola does not identify
any other change he wishes to make to his pleading, and his
proposed amended complaint [ECF #13] consists of his first
amended complaint [ECF #7] and the one-page motion to amend.
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Motion to Amend
Although
the Court should “freely give leave” to amend a
complaint “when justice so requires, ”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2), it has discretion to deny such a
request if the proposed amendment would be futile, see In
re Montreal, Me. & Atlantic Ry., Ltd., 888 F.3d 1,
12 (1st Cir. 2018).
The
Court allows DeNicola's motion to amend to specify that
he is asserting his claims against the defendants in their
individual capacities, but the Court denies as futile the
motion to amend the complaint to bring claims against the
defendants in their official capacities.
“Personal-capacity
suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government
official for actions he takes under color of state
law.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165
(1985). In contrast, official capacity suits “generally
represent only another way of pleading an action against an
entity of which an officer is an agent.” Id.
(quoting Monell v. N.Y. City Dep't of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, n.55 (1978)).[1] Thus, official
capacity claims against Comerford and Tobin would be the
equivalent of claims against the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, and official capacity claims against Potter
and Keenan would be the equivalent of claims against the City
of Quincy.
The
Court construes DeNicola's amended complaint as asserting
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his
constitutional rights.[2] This statute provides that any
“person, ” acting under the color of state law,
who “subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Supreme Court has ruled that neither a state nor state
officials acting in their official capacities are
“persons” within the meaning of § 1983,
see Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 71 (1989), thus precluding DeNicola from asserting
official capacity claims against Comerford and Tobin, see
Johnson v. Rodriguez, 943 F.2d 104, 108 (1st Cir. 1991)
(“It is settled beyond peradventure, however, that
neither a state agency nor a state official acting in his
official capacity may be sued for damages in a § 1983
action.”).
A
municipality or other local government unit is a
“person” within the meaning of § 1983.
See Monell, 436 U.S. 690-91. However, only parties
who have directly participated or are otherwise directly
involved in the conduct that deprived the plaintiff of his
federal constitutional rights can be held liable under §
1983. See Cepero-Rivera v. Fagundo, 414 F.3d 124,
129 (1st Cir. 2005). In the context of a § 1983 claim
against a municipality, this means that the plaintiff must
allege facts from which a court can reasonably infer that
“the municipality itself cause[d] the constitutional
violation at issue.” Canton v. Harris, 489
U.S. 378, 385 (1989). “It is only when the execution of
the government's policy or custom . . . inflicts the
injury that the municipality may be held liable under §
1983.” Id. (alteration in original) ...