United States District Court, D. Massachusetts
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM ON DEFENDANT MIDDLETON'S
MOTION TO DISMISS (Docket No. 38)
TIMOTHY S. HILLMAN DISTRICT JUDGE
Brown Madison (“Plaintiff”) asserts several
claims against various Defendants for retaliation after it
was revealed that he worked as an informant for law
enforcement officials. Relevant to this motion, he brings
claims against former First Assistant District Attorney for
the Plymouth County District Attorney's Office, Frank
Middleton (“Defendant Middleton”), for violation
of his Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment, negligence, negligent infliction of
emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress by “failing to intervene and/or prevent”
Defendants Cruz and Bradley from revealing his identity as an
informant and subsequently failing to notify prison officials
of the risk to his safety. (Count XXXII).
McDonald has moved to dismiss all claims pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). (Docket No. 38). For the reasons
stated below, Defendant's motion is
factual background is taken from Plaintiff's Complaint
(Docket No. 1) and assumed to be true at this stage of the
litigation. The Court will also consider facts susceptible of
judicial notice that “can be accurately and readily
determined from sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably
be questioned.” Fed.R.Evid. 201(b).
to 2015, Plaintiff worked as an informant for the Plymouth
County District Attorney's Office (“PCDAO”),
the Massachusetts State Police, and the Brockton Police. On
July 5, 2015, Defendants Bradley and Cruz revealed to the
Boston Globe Plaintiff's identity as an informant and his
activities as such.
the Boston Globe article was published, Plaintiff was a
pretrial detainee at the Essex County Correctional Facility
(“ECCF”). After the article was published, other
inmates continually harassed Plaintiff, threw urine on him,
placed feces in his food, and assaulted him, which resulted
in a black eye and abrasions on his face. Plaintiff was
subsequently placed in solitary confinement and, upon
rejoining the general population, was again assaulted.
Plaintiff was transferred to the Plymouth County Correction
Facility (“PCCF”) where he was again attacked by
inmates. Plaintiff continues to experience blurred vision,
difficulties concentrating, migraines, insomnia, and anxiety
as a result of the attacks.
Court will take judicial notice of the fact that in April
2015, Defendant Middleton resigned from his position as First
Assistant District Attorney.
defendant may also move to dismiss, based solely on the
complaint, for the plaintiff's “failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a
complaint must allege “a plausible entitlement to
relief.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 559, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007). Although detailed factual
allegations are not necessary to survive a motion to dismiss,
the standard “requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555, 127
S.Ct. 1955. “The relevant inquiry focuses on the
reasonableness of the inference of liability that the
plaintiff is asking the court to draw from the facts alleged
in the complaint.” Ocasio-Hernandez v.
Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2011).
evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court must accept all
factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.
Langadinos v. American Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 68,
68 (1st Cir. 2000). It is a “context-specific
task” to determine “whether a complaint states a
plausible claim for relief, ” one that “requires
the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) (internal citations omitted).
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court
to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id.
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). On the other hand, a court
may not disregard properly pled factual allegations,
“even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of
those facts is improbable.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955.
Plaintiff appears pro se, we construe his pleadings more
favorably than we would those drafted by an attorney. See
Erickson v. Pardus,551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197
(2007). Nevertheless, Plaintiff's pro-se status does not
excuse him from complying with procedural and ...