United States District Court, D. Massachusetts
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
RICHARD G. STEARNS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
se plaintiff Elizabeth Rodriguez brought this lawsuit
against Wells Fargo Bank alleging unconscionable delays in
approving the modification of a mortgage loan agreement.
Wells Fargo now moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons to be
explained, the motion to dismiss will be allowed.
claims that she “submitted all necessary documents
multiple time[s] to modify her loan, ” and faults Wells
Fargo for “delay[ing] the process and repeatedly
requesting the same documents over and over.” Pl.'s
Compl. (Dkt # 1) at ¶¶ 4-5. She asks the court to
“order the WELLS FARGO BANK [to] issue and send [a]
loan modification in regard to her home.” Id.
at 1. The Complaint contains no information pertinent to the
loan agreement that she seeks to modify.
Fargo believes that the loan in question dates from May 12,
2004, and is secured by property that Rodriguez identifies as
her residence at 41-45 Kirk Street in Methuen, Massachusetts.
Def.'s Mem. (Dkt # 6) at 2. If so, Wells Fargo is the
current mortgagee and servicer for the loan, Manuel
Rodriguez, however, is the sole named borrower on the
mortgage agreement. Id. at 2, Ex. A, at
Federal Rules require that a prayer for relief contain
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2). Although the pleading standard does not require a
plaintiff to set forth “detailed factual allegations,
” “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is
facially plausible if its factual content “allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678. “If the factual allegations in the
complaint are too meager, vague, or conclusory to remove the
possibility of relief from the realm of mere conjecture, the
complaint is open to dismissal.”
Rodríguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodríguez,
711 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2013), quoting SEC v.
Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 442 (1st Cir. 2010) (en banc).
preliminary matter, Rodriguez fails to establish
“standing to vindicate the rights of a borrower”
because she does not claim to be “a signatory on [a]
loan note” with Wells Fargo. Anctil v. Specialized
Loan Servicing, LLC, 2016 WL 70451, at *1 (D. Mass. Jan.
6, 2016). Moreover, Rodriguez fails to allege sufficient
facts to support a cause of action. Although her pro
se status requires the court to read the Complaint with
“an extra degree of solicitude, ” Rodi v.
Ventetuolo, 941 F.2d 22, 23 (1st Cir.1991), it
“does not insulate [her] from complying with procedural
and substantive law.” Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118
F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997). At a minimum, she must recount
“facts as to who did what to whom, when, where, and why
. . . .” Educadores Puertorriqueños en
Accion v. Hernandez, 367 F.3d 61, 68 (1st Cir. 2004).
Because the court cannot discern from the five-paragraph
Complaint how Wells Fargo is alleged to have acted unlawfully
or how Rodriguez suffered a personal injury as a result, a
liberal reading does not save it from dismissal.
foregoing reasons, defendant's motion to dismiss is
ALLOWED. The Clerk will enter judgment for the defendant on
all claims and close the case.
 The court generally considers only
facts alleged in documents attached to or expressly
incorporated in the complaint, unless it converts the motion
to dismiss into one for summary judgment. Watterson v.
Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d).
Because the mortgage is recorded in the Essex County Registry
of Deeds and as “official public records, ” the