United States District Court, D. Massachusetts
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
SOROKIN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
action, pro se litigant Guillaume Tabia alleges that
a state district court wrongly issued an abuse prevention
order against him under M.G.L. ch. 209A (“ch.
209A”), which allows an application to seek a
restraining order against a “family or household
member.” M.G.L. ch. 209A § 3. Tabia maintains
that, based on the relationship between him and the alleged
victim, any restraining order should have been issued
pursuant to M.G.L. ch. 258E (“ch. 258E”), which
does not require any particular relationship between the
applicant and the defendant. See M.G.L. ch. 258E, Â§
3. Tabia, who is not a citizen of the United States,
represents that he is now subject to removal from the United
States because a ch. 209A restraining order was issued
against him. He implies that, had the restraining order been
issued under ch. 258E, he would not be facing removal. For
the reasons stated below, the Court will order that this
action be DISMISSED.
commenced this action on May 16, 2019 by filing a complaint
[ECF #1] against Haverhill Police Officer G. Dekeon, First
Justice Stephen S. Abany of Haverhill District Court, and a
clerk magistrate at the Haverhill District Court. He also
filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis [ECF #2]. Tabia is currently confined at the
Bristol County Jail and House of Correction as an immigration
complaint, Tabia alleged that on May 23, 2017, he was
“maliciously enjoined with a domestic RO [Restraining
Order] (c. 209) for a civil misdemeanor assault and battery
instead of a civil RO (c. 258E) by the Commonwealth in
complete disregard of the Haverhill District Court on the
basis of my gender, race, contry [sic] of origin and social
class.” Compl. at 4. Tabia failed to specify the role
each defendant played in the alleged misconduct.
memorandum and order dated May 17, 2019, the Court granted
Tabia's motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. Reviewing the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(b), the Court concluded that Tabia had
failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
because the complaint did not comply with the pleading
requirements of Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Court directed him to file an amended
complaint in which he identified the alleged misconduct of
each defendant. The Court also noted that it appeared that
claims against the judge and the clerk magistrate were would
be barred by judicial and quasi-judicial immunity.
timely filed an amended complaint [ECF #7]. The exhibits to
the amended complaint consist of: (1) the docket of the
criminal prosecution against Tabia arising from the alleged
events of December 1, 2016, indicating that he was charged
with assault and battery and malicious damage to a motor
vehicle; (2) Officer DeKeon's incident report regarding
the alleged events of December 1, 2016; (3) one page from a
statement of facts in support of an application for a
criminal complaint, signed by Office DeKeon (presumably
against Tabia); (4) a ch. 209A abuse prevention order against
Tabia signed by First Justice Abany on February 22 and March
1, 2017; (5) an application for a ch. 209A abuse prevention
order against Tabia; and (6) a copy of M.G.L. ch 209A, §
1, which contains the definitions of certain terms used in
incident report, Officer DeKeon states that, on December 1,
2016, he arrived at Tabia's residence after receiving a
report of a disturbance. Officer DeKeon claims to have
interviewed a male witness outside of the residence, who
reported that he witnessed Tabia assault a female victim
residing at that address and break the windows of her car.
According to Officer DeKeon's report, he later
interviewed the female victim at the hospital. Officer DeKeon
states in his report that the victim told him that she and
Tabia were just friends, that Tabia had briefly stayed at her
residence because he was experiencing housing difficulties,
that he had moved out a week ago, and that he had returned to
the premises that morning to look for some of his belongs.
Officer DeKeon further states that he informed the victim of
her rights under ch. 209A, and that the victim indicated she
wanted to go to court to get a restraining order against
to Tabia, Officer DeKeon should not have told the victim that
she could seek a restraining order under ch. 209A. Tabia
asserts that the witness “never mentioned [to Officer
DeKeon] at any moment, any existing relationship enumerated
under c. 209A § 1 which will be the basis of a domestic
abuse prevention order.” Amend. Compl. ¶ 2. Tabia
further asserts that the victim's statement that they
were only friends “clearly indicates that the incidence
is not domestic in nature but rather civil-requiring a civil
restraining order [under M.G.L.] ch. 258E.”
Id. ¶ 3. According to Tabia, “[a]ll the
information necessary for the proper injunction
[i.e., one under ch. 258E] were in the officer's
possession through his own investigation but he chose to
disregard them for some ulterior reasons.” Id.
also expected First Justice Abany and the Clerk Magistrate
“to verify and carefully analyze the allegations on the
police reports and the court testimonies of the plaintiff . .
. before deciding the type of injunction that is required
instead of being subjective and completely turning the blind
eye on the nature of the incident.” Id. ¶
4. Tabia states that careful attention to the statutory basis
of the restraining order was important “[i]n light of
the extreme and severe colateral [sic] consequences of the
putative c.209A injunction (domestic abuse prevention order)
which include deportation of a non-Citizen.”
asks that the Court “enjoin the proper injunctions
necessary to the Judicial officials of Haverhill District
Court (the defendants) for the colateral [sic] consequences .
. . currently inflicted upon this plaintiff” and
monetary relief from Officer DeKeon. Id. at
amended complaint adequately identifies the alleged
misconduct of each defendant, thus curing the pleading
deficiency discussed in the Court's May 17, 2019 order.
In addition, the issue of judicial and quasi-judicial
immunity is not a bar to Tabia's claim because it is
clear that he is not seeking monetary damages from First
Justice Abany or the Clerk Magistrate.
the amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted against Officer DeKeon. Aside from
Tabia's conclusory statements, nothing in the amended
complaint suggests that Officer DeKeon violated Tabia's
rights in advising the victim of her rights under ch. 209A.
Under ch. 209A, “[a] person suffering from abuse from
an adult or minor family or household member may file a
complaint in the court requesting protection from such
abuse.” M.G.L. ch. 209A, § 3. The definition of
“household member” includes “persons who .
. . are or were residing together in the same
household.” M.G.L. ch. 209A, § 1. In this case,
Tabia alleges that he and the victim had the same address.
See Amend. Compl. ¶ 1. Officer DeKeon's
report indicates that the victim told him that Tabia had
resided with ...