United States District Court, D. Massachusetts
CYNTHIA L. MOMPOINT, Plaintiff,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, HEATHER PESKE, and HELENE BETTENCOURT, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
DENISE
J. CASPER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
I.
Introduction
Plaintiff
Cynthia Mompoint (“Mompoint”) has filed this
lawsuit against Defendants the Department of Elementary and
Secondary Education (“Mass DOE”), Assistant
Commissioner Heather Peske (“Peske”) and Director
Helene Bettencourt (“Bettencourt”) (collectively,
“Defendants”) alleging violations of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and defamation. D. 23.
Defendants have moved to dismiss the now amended complaint.
D. 26. For the reasons stated below, the Court ALLOWS
Defendants' motion.
II.
Standard of Review
On a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the
Court must determine if the facts alleged “plausibly
narrate a claim for relief.” Schatz v. Republican
State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012)
(citation omitted). Reading the complaint “as a whole,
” the Court must conduct a two-step, context-specific
inquiry. García-Catalán v. United
States, 734 F.3d 100, 103 (1st Cir. 2013). First, the
Court must perform a close reading of the claim to
distinguish the factual allegations from the conclusory legal
allegations contained therein. Id. Factual
allegations must be accepted as true, while conclusory legal
conclusions are not entitled credit. Id. Second, the
Court must determine whether the factual allegations present
a “reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the conduct alleged.” Haley v. City of
Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir. 2011) (citation
omitted). In sum, the complaint must provide sufficient
factual allegations for the Court to find the claim
“plausible on its face.”
García-Catalán, 734 F.3d at 103
(citation omitted).
The
Court will dismiss a pleading that fails to include
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “To avoid
dismissal, a complaint must provide ‘a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.'” García-Catalán,
734 F.3d at 102. “A pleading that offers ‘labels
and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.'” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (alteration in original).
“In determining whether a complaint crosses the
plausibility threshold, ‘the reviewing court [must]
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.'”
García-Catalán, 734 F.3d at 103
(alteration in original) (citation omitted). “This
context-specific inquiry does not demand ‘a high degree
of factual specificity.'” Id. (citation
omitted).
When a
plaintiff is pro se, the Court must apply a liberal
reading to the complaint and hold pro se litigants
to a less stringent pleading standard. Green v.
Commonwealth of Mass., 108 F.R.D. 217, 218 (D. Mass.
1985). A pro se plaintiff, however, must still
comply with procedural and substantive law and
“dismissal remains appropriate . . . when the complaint
fails to even suggest an actionable claim.” Overton
v. Torruella, 183 F.Supp.2d 295, 303 (D. Mass. 2001).
III.
Factual Background
The
following facts are taken from Mompoint's amended
complaint, D. 23; D. 23-1, and the Court accepts them as true
for the purposes of resolving this motion. Mompoint is a
former employee of Mass. DOE. D. 23-1 ¶ 1. In or about
July 2011, Mompoint applied for a permanent position in the
Teacher Quality unit at Mass. DOE but received a temporary
position instead. D. 23-1 ¶ 4. Mompoint's temporary
employment was funded through a federal “Race to the
Top” grant. D. 23-1 ¶ 1. There were seven
temporary employees, including Mompoint, who were funded by
Race to the Top through 2015 and worked in a unit led by
Defendant Peske. Id. Five of the employees were
white and two of the employees, including Mompoint, were
black. Id. Two years before her funding through Race
to the Top ended, Mompoint applied for a permanent
“Educator Quality” position within Mass. DOE but
did not receive it. D. 23-1 ¶ 4. In 2015, Mompoint's
temporary position ended. D. 23-1 ¶ 1. The five white
employees funded by Race to the Top were either moved to
permanent positions within Mass. DOE or given state funding,
but the black employees were both terminated. Id. At
some point, an unnamed “supervisor [was] hired over
[Mompoint]” who was less qualified for the position and
“did not have the leadership experience, supervisory
experience, education experience, or the caliber of education
that [Mompoint] had.” D. 23-1 ¶ 7.
Mompoint
alleges that Mass. DOE's “practice of denying
blacks promotions and limited opportunities for advancement
is systemic” and that based on her “observation
and communication with black employees (both former and
current), [Mass DOE] rarely selects black employees for
professional development opportunities” that are
necessary for obtaining permanent positions. D. 23-1 ¶
5. According to Mompoint, Mass. DOE has data showing that of
the thirty-four white employees hired under the Race to the
Top grant, thirteen resigned or retired before the grant
expired and seventeen of the remaining twenty-one were given
other funding or positions and remained employed at Mass. DOE
after the grant ended. D. 23-1 ¶ 3. In contrast, of the
five black employees hired under the grant, one resigned, one
was retained and the other three were released. Id.
Mompoint
further alleges that she was treated differently than white
employees in terms of her ability to telecommute and bring
her children to work. In February 2015, Peske denied
Mompoint's request to work from home for medical reasons,
even though a white employee had received permission to
telecommute for medical reasons for approximately twelve
months in 2013. D. 23-1 ¶ 9. After Mompoint gave Peske a
doctor's note, however, she was permitted to telecommute.
Id. Mass. DOE did not have a formal telecommuting
policy. Id. In June 2015, Mompoint requested to
telecommute but was denied. Id. Mompoint does not
state whether she submitted a doctor's note on this
occasion. Regarding children in the workplace, Mompoint
alleges that when she brought her child to work, her
supervisor told her children were not allowed in the
workplace, even though white co-workers had previously
brought their children to work. D. 23-1 ¶ 10.
Mompoint
also alleges that while employed by Mass. DOE, Peske engaged
in “defamation of character” against her. D. 23-1
¶ 8. This allegation arises from comments posted on a
“staff recognition board” that Peske implemented
for her unit. Id. Peske posted compliments about
members of the staff weekly. Id. Mompoint alleges
that Peske only posted compliments for staff members of color
about once per month. Id. When Peske posted
compliments about Mompoint's work, she used words such as
“good, ” while using words such as
“great” or “excellent” to describe
white employees' work. Id. Mompoint alleges that
Peske's words “cast[] a perception of
‘mediocrity'” on Mompoint's work, which
in turn affected how certain colleagues interacted with her.
Id. After the alleged disparity was communicated to
Peske, Peske “started to use a variety of word[s] [] to
describe all staff members including staff of color.”
Id.
IV.
Procedural History
Mompoint
instituted this action on May 23, 2018. D. 1. Defendants
moved to dismiss, and the Court denied the motion without
prejudice. D. 18. The Court explained that Mompoint had
failed to allege the required elements for defamation and
“fail[ed] to state her race in the complaint or make
any allegations tying her race or gender to any alleged
discrimination, ” but allowed Mompoint to amend her
complaint. Id. at 5. Accordingly, on January 14,
2019, Mompoint filed an amended complaint, D. 23, and
Defendants ...