MARJORIE Y. EVANS
FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION & another. 
Process. Housing Court. Supreme Judicial Court,
Superintendence of inferior courts.
Maryanne Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General, for the
Central Division of the Housing Court Department.
Linehan for Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation. Marjorie
Evans, pro se. Christine Hilton, pro se. John Schumacher, pro
se. Annette Bent, pro se., Mychelyne Oliveira, pro se.
petitioner, Marjorie Y. Evans, appeals from a judgment of a
single justice of this court denying her petition pursuant to
G. L. c. 211, § 3. We affirm.
respondent, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie
Mac), purchased Evans's home at a foreclosure sale in
March 2015 and then commenced a summary process eviction
action against Evans in October 2015. The summary process
trial was continued several times, at least in part because
of discovery disputes between the parties, but was eventually
scheduled to commence on June 8, 2016. On that day, Evans
filed a motion for a continuance and for a reasonable
accommodation on the basis of a disability. Before the judge
ruled on these motions, Evans left the court house. The judge
denied the motions, and because Evans was not present for
trial, a default judgment for possession entered against her.
Evans's motion to vacate the judgment was denied, and she
subsequently filed a notice of appeal. Over the next several
months, Evans filed numerous motions to stay execution of the
judgment, in both the Housing Court and the Appeals Court, to
allow her time to pursue her appeal. She successfully secured
a stay, but was ordered to make monthly use and occupancy
payments while the appeal was pending. After Evans failed to
make use and occupancy payments for several months, Freddie
Mac levied on its execution for possession of the property on
May 4, 2017. On that same day, Evans filed, and the single
justice denied, a G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition as well as
another motion to stay.
appeal to this court, Evans argues, among other things, that
the Housing Court judge erred in denying her request for a
reasonable accommodation; erred in violating a Federal
Bankruptcy Court automatic stay order; and, more generally,
violated her right to due process. She asks the court for
various forms of relief, including reversing the Housing
Court's "erroneous rulings" and vacating the
Housing Court's void judgments. The petitioner has not,
however, met her burden "to demonstrate the absence or
inadequacy of other remedies," as she must for the
purposes of G. L. c. 211, § 3. Russell
v. Nichols, 434 Mass. 1015, 1016 (2001). In
fact, she has not even addressed the issue. As we further
explain today in the Adj artey case, we recognize
the challenges that self-represented litigants may face in
summary process actions, but this does negate the statutory
requirement. Relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, is
"properly denied where there are adequate and effective
routes other than [G. L.] c. 211, § 3, by which the
petitioning party may seek relief." Greco
v. Plymouth Sav. Bank, 423 Mass. 1019, 1019
(1996). This applies to self-represented litigants as well as
those who are represented by counsel. See International
Fid. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 387 Mass.
841, 847 (1983) (unrepresented litigants are bound by same
rules of procedural and substantive law as represented
example, Evans could have sought review of the denial of her
motion to vacate void judgments, which she filed pursuant to
Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b) (4), 365 Mass. 828 (1974), in a
direct appeal. See Brown v. Federal
Nat'1 Mtge. Ass'n, 481 Mass. 1036, 1037 (2019)
(denial of motion to vacate void judgment can be addressed in
direct appeal). This is equally true of the denial of any
recusal request. See Hilton v. Central
Div. of the Hous. Court Dep't, 481 Mass. (2019).
Similarly, if Evans believed she was prejudiced by a
judge's erroneous denial of her requests for reasonable
accommodations, she could have raised that claim in a direct
appeal. To the extent that Evans argues that the
Housing Court denied her request for assembly of the record,
thus preventing her from pursuing her appeal, her argument on
this point is not well developed. And while the Housing Court
docket does indicate that a motion to assemble the record was
denied, the basis for the denial is not clear; in any event,
the denial of such a motion is also subject to appellate
review in the form of a direct appeal. See, e.g.,
Gorod v. Tabachnick, 428 Mass.
1001, 1001-1002, cert, denied sub nom. Davis
v. Tabachnick, 525 U.S. 1003 (1998). See
also Skandha v. Clerk of the Superior
Court for Civ. Bus, in Suffolk County, 472 Mass. 1017,
1018 (2015) (detailing "variety of . . . practical and
legal steps" available when seeking to compel assembly
single justice did not err or abuse her discretion in denying
relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3.
 The petitioner also named the
Worcester Division of the Housing Court Department (now part
of the Central Division, see St. 2017, c. 47, § 78) as a
respondent. The court is a nominal party only. See S.J.C.
Rule 2:22, 422 Mass. 1302 (1996).
 This case is one of three that we
decide today that involve self-represented litigants engaged
in summary process proceedings in the Central Division of the
Housing Court Department. See Adj artey v.
Central Div. of the Hous. Court Pep't, 481 Mass.
(2019); Hilton v. Central Div. of the Hous.
Court Dep't, 481 Mass. (2019). The petitioner in
this case is also a petitioner in both the Adj artey
and the Hilton cases. To the extent that she raises
issues here that are also raised and addressed in those
cases, we do not address them separately here.
 The accommodation that Evans sought
was a postponement of the proceedings to allow her to obtain
counsel because, she argued, appearing pro se put significant
stress on her health. This was not the first ...