United States District Court, D. Massachusetts
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
RICHARD G. STEARNS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
reasons set forth below, the Court grants the motion for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis, denies the
emergency motion and dismisses this action under the
Younger doctrine and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
is an attorney seeking to challenge a state court order of
administrative suspension from the practice of law. Now
before the Court are Plaintiff's complaint, amended
complaint, motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis and emergency motion for temporary stay of
administrative suspension. See Docket Nos. 1-3, 6.
brings this action against the Chief Justice of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. See Amended
Complaint (“Am. Compl.”), Docket No. 6. Plaintiff
alleges that the defendant judge deprived plaintiff of
“a property right without complying with [Liviz']
request for a jury trial in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983 Civil
Rights Act by depriving Ilya Liviz (“Liviz”)
pursuant to First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eight[h], Ninth,
& Fourteenth Amendments, Due Process right to access to a
court of law.” Id. at ¶ 2. Plaintiff
alleges that “Bar Counsel filed her Petition for
Administrative Suspension” on April 1, 2019.
Id. at ¶ 7. The same day, Liviz filed three
motions; several seeking to challenge the Petition.
Id. at ¶ 10. The following day, on April 2,
2019, Chief Justice Gants issued an “Order of Immediate
Administrative Suspension.” Id. at ¶ 13.
contends that Chief Justice Gants should have recused himself
due to a conflict of interest, id. at p. 20, and
that “Bar Counsel has harassed [Liviz] before, and was
harassing [Liviz] again.” Id. at ¶ 22.
Liviz states that the sole allegation submitted by Bar
Counsel in support of the petition for administrative
suspension is that Liviz failed “to comply with Bar
Counsel requests.” Id. at ¶ 21. Liviz
asserts that he has a right to trial and a “right to
remain silent.” Id. Liviz states that he
“did not violate any laws” and that his
“rights are being blatantly violated.”
Id. at ¶ 24. Liviz seeks to have this Court
issue “a temporary ex parte TRO stay of the
administrative suspension” so that he can continue to
practice law. Id. at ¶ 23.
review of Liviz' motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis, the Court concludes that he is without income
or assets to pay the $400.00 filing and administrative fees.
The motion therefore is granted.
federal in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. §
1915, is designed to ensure meaningful access to the federal
courts for those persons unable to pay the costs of bringing
an action. When a party is proceeding in forma
pauperis, however, “the court shall dismiss the
case at any time if the court determines, ” among other
things, that the action is “frivolous or
malicious” or “fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted” or “seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). “Dismissals [under §
1915] are often made sua sponte prior to the
issuance of process, so as to spare prospective defendants
the inconvenience and expense of answering such
complaints.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 324 (1989).
examining the sufficiency of the pleadings, the court
considers whether the plaintiff has pled “enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted).
initial matter, the federal Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283, prohibits a federal court from granting an
injunction to stay proceedings in a state court except in
very limited circumstances, none of which apply here.
the Court finds that Liviz' challenge to the
Massachusetts state court order is precluded under the
Younger abstention doctrine. The Younger
doctrine is a court-made rule of abstention built around the
principle that, with limited exceptions, federal courts
should refrain from issuing injunctions that interfere with
ongoing state-court litigation, or, in some cases, with state
administrative proceedings. See generally Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-45 (1971). A federal court must
abstain from reaching the merits of a case over which it has
jurisdiction if it “would interfere (1) with an ongoing
state judicial proceeding; (2) that implicates an important
state interest; and (3) that provides an adequate opportunity
for the federal plaintiff to advance his federal
constitutional challenge.” Rossi v. Gemma, 489
F.3d 26, 34-35 (1st Cir. 2007). Younger abstention