United States District Court, D. Massachusetts
ILYA LIVIZ, SR., et al.
CHIEF JUSTICE RALPH D. GANTS, et al.,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
RICHARD G. STEARNS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
reasons set forth below, the court grants the motion for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis, denies the
emergency motions and dismisses this action pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
March 13, 2019 Ilya Liviz, an attorney proceeding on behalf
of himself and his minor son, commenced this action against
each individual justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court and a defendant identified in the case caption as John
Doe. See Compl. (Dkt. No. 1). Although Liviz
references 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242, 245, id.
¶ 2, he states that “[t]his is not a criminal
complaint, this is an application, verified by oath under
pains and penalty of perjury, for appointment of U.S.
Prosecutor to follow through with the criminal
complaint.” Id. ¶ 3. Liviz has been a
frequent litigant in this court and was recently suspended
from the practice of law in Massachusetts. See Liviz v.
Gants, No. 19-10644-RGS (dismissed Apr. 8, 2019).
pending before the court are Liviz's motions for
emergency relief and to proceed in forma pauperis.
See Dkt. Nos. 2-3, 5. Liviz seeks, among other
things, a stay of all pending state actions concerning the
custody of his son and the issuance of a show cause order why
a writ of habeas corpus should not issue. See Dkt.
Nos. 3, 5.
review of Liviz's motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis, the court concludes that he is without
income or assets to pay the $400.00 filing and administrative
fees. The motion therefore is granted.
federal in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. §
1915, is designed to ensure meaningful access to the federal
courts for those persons unable to pay the costs of bringing
an action. When a party is proceeding in forma
pauperis, however, “the court shall dismiss the
case at any time if the court determines, ” among other
things, that the action is “frivolous or
malicious” or “fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted” or “seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). “Dismissals [under §
1915] are often made sua sponte prior to the
issuance of process, so as to spare prospective defendants
the inconvenience and expense of answering such
complaints.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 324 (1989).
examining the sufficiency of the pleadings, the court
considers whether the plaintiff has pled “enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted).
initial matter, the federal Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283, prohibits a federal court from granting an
injunction to stay proceedings in a state court except in
very limited circumstances, none of which apply here.
Moreover, as Liviz recognizes, the federal criminal statutes
referenced in the complaint do not confer a private right of
action. See Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 2 (1st
Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (stating that only the
United States as prosecutor can bring a complaint under 18
U.S.C. §§ 241-242); Stone v. Warfield, 184
F.R.D. 553, 555 (D. Md. 1999) (stating that individual
citizens have no private right of action to institute federal
criminal prosecutions). Private citizens, such as Liviz, lack
“a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or
nonprosecution of another.” Willoughby v. Town of
Tisbury, 750 F.Supp.2d 374, 381, n.57 (D. Mass. 2010)
(citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619
reasons previously stated, it ...