United States District Court, D. Massachusetts
CITIBANK, N.A., not in Its Individual Capacity but Solely as Separate Trustee for PMT NPL FINANCING 2015-1, Plaintiff,
RENEE ANNA NAJDA a/k/a RENEE NAJDA, and ANDREW NAJDA, Defendants and Counterclaimants,
CITIBANK, N.A., not in Its Individual Capacity but Solely as Separate Trustee for PMT NPL FINANCING 2015-1, and CITIMORTGAGE, INC., Counterclaim Defendants.
A. O'TOOLE, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Order resolves the several pending motions:
Defendants Renee and Andrew Najda's Renewed Motion for
Judgment and Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3) (dkt. no. 375) is
DENIED for substantially the same reasons advanced by the
plaintiff Citibank, N.A. as trustee for PMT NPL Financing
2015-1 (“Citibank”) in its opposition and those
relied upon by this Court in its repeated rejection of the
defendant's jurisdictional argument.
defendants' Rule 59 Motion for New Trial and Motion to
Amend or Alter the Judgment (dkt. no. 376) is DENIED for
substantially the same reasons articulated by Citibank and
CitiMortgage, Inc. in their oppositions and those previously
relied upon by this Court. With respect to a new trial, the
defendants have not shown that the jury's verdict or
Court's findings of fact were “against the
demonstrable weight of the credible evidence” or that
action is required to prevent a “blatant miscarriage of
injustice, ” See Foisy v. Royal Maccabees Life
Ins., 356 F.3d 141, 146 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting
Sanchez v. P.R. Oil Co., 37 F.3d 712, 717 (1st Cir.
1994)); see also Barbosa v. Hyland, No. CIV.A.
11-11997-JGD, 2014 WL 1689607, at *1 (D. Mass. Apr. 28, 2014)
(quotations omitted) (new trial motion in non-jury case
“should be based upon manifest error of law or mistake
of fact”). As Citibank and CitiMortgage observe, the
majority of the defendants' contentions were already
argued in some form and rejected, and the defendants do not
now raise any convincing new arguments which call into
question the correctness of the prior rulings or demonstrate
that the trial was manifestly unfair because of any
purportedly erroneous decisions.
respect to an amendment of the judgment, “an
extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly, ”
Palmer v. Champion Mortg., 465 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir.
2006) (quotation omitted), the defendants have not
demonstrated an intervening change in the law, manifest error
of law, or newly discovered evidence, see
Venegas-Hernandez v. Sonolux Records, 370 F.3d 183, 190
(1st Cir. 2005). The argument regarding the notice of
acceleration was previously raised by the defendants and was
rejected, at least implicitly, in the Court's post-trial
rulings. (See Opp'n to Pl. Citibank's Mot.
for J. on Partial Findings 11 (dkt. no. 358); Findings of
Fact, Rulings of Law, & Order for J. 4 (dkt. no. 368).)
The “repetition of previous arguments is not sufficient
to prevail on a Rule 59(e) motion.” United States
v. $23, 000 in U.S. Currency, 356 F.3d 157, 165 n.9 (1st
Cir. 2004); see also Palmer, 465 F.3d at 30. The
argument based upon the apparent post-trial transfer of the
note also fails. The defendants' purported “new
evidence” does not involve the facts as they existed
during the time of trial. Whether Citibank now will be able to
proceed with the foreclosure process under the Conditional
Judgment is a separate matter.
both parties apparently agree that Citibank may assign the
judgment without Court involvement, (see Pl.'s
Mot. to Assign the J. 4 n.3 (dkt. no. 392); Defs.'
Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. to Assign J. 3 (dkt. no. 396);
Pl.'s Reply to Defs.' Opp'n to Its Mot. to Assign
the J. 3 (dkt. no. 407)), Citibank's Motion to Assign the
Judgment (dkt. no. 392) is DENIED at this time.
counsel are reminded of their obligations under the Local
Rules, including but not limited to Rule 7.1(a)(2)
(requirement to certify that counsel has conferred in good
faith prior to filing any motions), Rule 7.1(b)(1)
(requirement of separate memoranda in support of motions),
and Rule 7.1(b)(4) (twenty-page limit on memoranda). Future
non-conforming submissions may be stricken for failure to
comply with the Local Rules. See L.R. 1.3.
 The defendants contend that the facts
existed before judgment entered and therefore during the time
of trial. In that regard, it was incumbent on the defendants
to raise the issue before judgment entered in more than a
passing comment in a footnote of a reply brief and in support
of a different legal theory. (See Defs.' Reply
to Pl.'s Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. for Directed
Verdict 6 n.4 (dkt. no. 364).) Rule 59(e) is not a ...