DANIEL D. TAVARES
P. Tavares, pro se.
Elizabeth M. Carey, Assistant Pistrict Attorney, for the
petitioner, Daniel D. Tavares, appeals from a judgment of a
single justice of this court denying his petition pursuant to
G. L. c. 211, § 3. We affirm.
was convicted by a jury "of possessing counterfeit
currency, uttering a counterfeit note, and larceny by false
pretenses of property not exceeding $250 in value."
Commonwealth v. Tavares, 87
Mass.App.Ct. 471, 471 (2015). The Appeals Court affirmed his
convictions, Id. at 475, and this court denied
further appellate review, Commonwealth v.
Tavares, 472 Mass. 1106 (2015). Years later, Tavares
filed a petition in the county court, pursuant to G. L. c.
211, § 3, seeking relief from the convictions. He
alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at
trial and on appeal, and that his convictions were wrongful
in myriad aspects. The single justice denied the petition
without a hearing.
single justice correctly denied relief under G. L. c. 211,
§ 3, because there are adequate alternative routes
available to Tavares to seek and obtain review of his claims.
See, e.g., Norris v. Commonwealth,
447 Mass. 1007, 1007 (2006); Maza v.
Commonwealth, 423 Mass. 1006, 1006 (1996) . The
errors raised in the petition either were or could have been
raised in his direct appeal from his convictions in the
Appeals Court. See Tavares, 87 Mass.App.Ct. at 471.
See Doyle v. Commonwealth, 472
Mass. 1002, 1003 (2015). The fact that he did not receive
relief does not render the ordinary appellate process
inadequate for purposes of G. L. c. 211, § 3. See
Saade v. Price, 480 Mass. 1024, 1024 (2018);
Votta v. Commonwealth, 435 Mass.
1013, 1013 (2002). Tavares also may raise challenges to his
convictions, including his claims concerning the
constitutional effectiveness of counsel, jury instructions,
and violation of his right against double jeopardy because
the same evidence or conduct formed the basis for multiple
convictions, by filing a motion for postconviction relief in
the District Court, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, as
appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), and by appealing from any
adverse ruling.See Sabree v.
Commonwealth, 479 Mass. 1006, 1007 (2018); Souza
v. Commonwealth, 473 Mass. 1016, 1016 (2015);
Doyle, supra at 1002-1003. See also
Commonwealth v. Cowie, 404 Mass.
119 (1989). "The fact that the petitioner 'failed to
pursue the alternative route or pursued it
unsuccessfully' does not create a right to relief under
G. L. c. 211, § 3." Wilborn v.
Commonwealth, 448 Mass. 1010, 1011 (2007), quoting
Tavares v. Commonwealth, 447 Mass.
1011, 1011 (2006).
"general superintendence power under G.L. c. 211, §
3, is extraordinary and to be exercised sparingly, not as a
substitute for the normal appellate process or merely to
provide an additional layer of appellate review after the
normal process has run its course." Votta
v. Police Pep't of Billerica, 444 Mass.
1001, 1001 (2005). The single justice neither erred nor
abused his discretion in denying the petition.
 The single justice also denied
Tavares's motion for appointment of counsel. Tavares
alleges no abuse of discretion or other error by the single
justice in denying the requested relief.
 Tavares's claim that double
jeopardy principles excuse him from pursuing the alternative
remedy provided by Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 is unfounded. With
exceptions not relevant here, a defendant who prevails on
direct appeal or through allowance of a motion for a new
trial is placed "under continuing jeopardy during the
pendency of the prosecution, rather than ... at risk of
double jeopardy." Commonwealth v.
Resende, 476 Mass. 141, 146-147 (2017). See Lydon v.
Commonwealth, 381 Mass. 356, 366 (1980), quoting
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91
(1978) (requiring "a criminal defendant to stand trial
again after he has successfully invoked a statutory right of
appeal to upset his first conviction ... is not an act of
government oppression of the sort against which the Double
Jeopardy Clause was intended to protect"). Tavares's
direct appeal having been concluded, a motion for
postconviction relief under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 provides an
avenue to raise any further challenge to the conviction. See
Doyle v. Commonwealth, 472 Mass.
1002, 1003 (2015) .
 We decline to consider on appeal
Tavares's requests for relief, including production of
documents, information, or things, and transmission of
records, that ...