United States District Court, D. Massachusetts
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAM G. YOUNG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
reasons stated below, the Court allows plaintiff's
motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis,
denies plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief, and
directs plaintiff to file an amended complaint.
February 19, 2019, Plaintiff Ilya Liviz
(“Liviz”), filed a complaint naming as defendants
the governor for each state. Docket No. 1. With the
complaint, Liviz filed a motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis. Docket No. 2. The following day, on
February 20, 2019, Liviz filed a corrected motion for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis and an
ex-parte application for temporary restraining order
and order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should
not issue. Docket Nos. 4, 5.
32-page complaint is divided into 6 parts as follows: Part I
(federal court jurisdiction); Part II (civil action general
allegations); Part III (class-wide injury); Part IV
(constitutional basis); Part V (injunctive relief class); and
Part VI (relief sought). See Complaint
(“Compl.”). In addition to asserting
constitutional and common-law claims, the complaint alleges
violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1,
et seq.; the Clayton Act; the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq.; 29 U.S.C. § 187(a);
42 U.S.C. § 1981; 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(1); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 42 U.S.C. § 1985; 42
U.S.C. § 1986. Id. at ¶¶ 120 - 180.
this purported class action, Liviz seeks to challenge alleged
discriminatory conduct concerning the right to travel.
Id. at ¶¶ 3, 48. Liviz alleges that his
Massachusetts drivers' license was (1) deemed
non-renewable based upon unpaid tickets, id. at
¶ 26, and (2) suspended based upon three surchargable
events. Id. at ¶ 28. Plaintiff explains that by
the paying applicable fees and completing a driver retraining
program, he could obtain a Massachusetts driver's
license. Id. at ¶ 30. However, Liviz complains
that that many of the listed offenses are inaccurate and/or
not within a 24-month period. Id. at ¶ 31.
Plaintiff contends that because of his indigence, his right
to operate a motor vehicle is improperly restricted by the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Id. at ¶ 39.
Plaintiff seeks unspecified damages, class certification and
injunctive relief. Id. at Part III (prayer for
the motion for injunctive relief, Liviz seeks an order
enjoining Governor Baker or any state agent from preventing
plaintiff from operating a motor vehicle. See
Pl.'s Mot., 5-1 (proposed order).
Plaintiff's Motions to Proceed in forma
review of Liviz' motions for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis, the Court concludes that he is without
income or assets to pay the $400.00 filing fee. The motions
are therefore granted.
Preliminary Screening of the Complaint
plaintiff seeks to file a complaint without prepayment of the
filing fee, summonses do not issue until the Court reviews
the complaint and determines that it satisfies the
substantive requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Section
1915 authorizes federal courts to dismiss a complaint sua
sponte if the claims therein lack an arguable basis in
law or in fact, fail to state a claim on which relief may be
granted, or seek monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §
federal court is empowered only to decide “cases”
and “controversies.” N.H. Right to Life
Political Action Comm. v. Gardner, 99 F.3d 8, 13 (1st
Cir. 1996) (citing U.S. Const. art. III). In order to
establish standing, Liviz must show that (1) he personally
has suffered some actual or imminent injury as a result of
the challenged conduct; (2) the injury can fairly be traced
to that conduct; and (3) the injury likely will be redressed
by a favorable decision from the court. Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
560-61 (1992). Here, there are no adequate allegations that
the non-Massachusetts defendants caused the plaintiff any
injury. Conclusory assertions of harm in states ...