Practice, Civil, Action in nature of certiorari. Housing
Dannielle Briscoe, pro se.
plaintiff, Akkima Dannielle Briscoe, filed several petitions
in the county court seeking relief from a summary process
judgment and other orders entered against her in the Housing
Court. The single justice denied relief. We
petitions Briscoe filed in the county court center on her
claim that the Housing Court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction in the summary process matter because the
subject rental property was held in trust for her. In denying
Briscoe relief, the single justice observed, among other
things, that she failed to demonstrate the absence of an
adequate alternative remedy. It is on that basis that we
affirm the single justice's judgment.
case is now before us on Briscoe's memorandum and
appendix pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass.
1301 (2001), which requires a party challenging an
interlocutory ruling of the trial court to "set forth
the reasons why review of the trial court decision cannot
adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse
judgment in the trial court or by other available
means." S.J.C. Rule 2:21 (2). The rule does not apply
here, because a final judgment has entered in the summary
process case in the Housing Court. See Carrington v.
Commonwealth, 473 Mass. 1015, 1015 (2015) . Regardless,
Briscoe's filings make it abundantly clear that she had
avenues available to her to pursue relief from the Housing
Court orders and judgment other than by means of the
petitions that she filed in this court. To the extent she
alleged that the underlying orders and judgment contain
mistakes or were based on a lack of jurisdiction, she could
have filed a motion pursuant to Rule 11(b) of the Uniform
Summary Process Rules (1980) and Mass. R. Civ. P. 60, 365
Mass. 828 (1974), and, if necessary, appealed from any
adverse ruling on such a motion. See Brown v. Federal
Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n, 481 Mass. (2019), and cases
cited; Chavoor v. Lewis, 383 Mass. 801, 805 n.3
(1981). She also could have obtained review of the orders and
judgment through the ordinary process of a direct appeal. See
Yahya v. Rocktop Partners I, LP, 479 Mass. 1035,
1036 (2018); Wallace v. PNC Bank, N.A., 478 Mass.
1020, 1021 (2018); Salomon S.A. v. LaFond,
463 Mass. 1003, 1003 (2012) (jurisdictional claims may be
reviewed on appeal). See also Rule 12 of the Uniform Summary
Process Rules (2004) .
the fourth groundless appeal taken by Briscoe from a single
justice's judgment denying a petition for extraordinary
relief that we have decided within a month. See also
Briscoe v. Middlesex Div. of the Juvenile Court
Dep't, 481 Mass. 1027 (2019); Briscoe v.
LSREF3/AH Chicago Tenant, LLC, 481 Mass. 1026 (2019);
Briscoe v. District Attorney for the N. Dist., 481
Mass. 1026 (2019). She is now on notice that if she files any
further requests for extraordinary relief that fail to
satisfy the basic requirements for justifying such relief --
i.e., showing the absence of adequate alternative remedies,
furnishing record support to substantiate her claims, and
presenting proper legal argument -- the court will consider
imposing an appropriate sanction against her, including a
possible restriction on future filings.
case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by a
memorandum of law.
 The single justice's judgment
expressly referred only to the "urgent petition for
special writ of certiorari" filed by Briscoe, although
it implicitly denied the other pleadings that she had filed
as well, namely, her petition for a writ of prohibition and a
petition seeking reformation of various orders, the
underlying Housing Court judgment, and the execution, on the
basis of mistake.
 Additionally, we observe that the
common-law writs of certiorari, prohibition, error, and
review, as well as various other writs, were abolished in the
Commonwealth by the adoption of the rules of civil procedure.
See Mass. R. Civ. P. 81 (b), 365 Mass. 841 (1974); Mass. R.
Civ. P. 60 (b), 365 Mass. 828 (1974) (last sentence). See
also Chavoor v. Lewis, 383 Mass. 801, 804-805 nn.2,
3 (1981). Although "[t]his court retains authority to
grant relief to correct and prevent errors and abuses in the
lower courts 'if no other remedy is expressly provided,
'" J_d., quoting G. L. c. 211, § 3, the single
justice in this case correctly concluded that the petitioner
failed to demonstrate the absence of any other adequate
remedy. See Myrick v. Superior Court Dep't, 479
Mass. 1012, 1012 (2018) (neither mandamus nor certiorari
substitute for ordinary appellate process); Commercial