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Guzman v. Boeing Co.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts

February 6, 2019



          Judith Gail Dein United States Magistrate Judge


         On October 26, 2010, the plaintiff, Adriana Guzman, was a passenger on American Airlines flight 1640 from Costa Rica to Boston when there was a rapid decompression incident which caused the aircraft to drop suddenly and the oxygen masks to be deployed. The plane was brought under control by the pilot and landed safely in Miami approximately 30 minutes later, after which Ms. Guzman and others continued to Boston on another plane. The aircraft was a Boeing 757, and the defendant The Boeing Company (“Boeing”) agreed to be responsible for any damages proximately caused by the decompression incident. Several persons on board brought the instant case, and all claims were settled prior to trial except for Ms. Guzman's claims.

         Ms. Guzman contends that as a result of the decompression incident, she suffered from PTSD, major depressive disorder and, to a lesser extent, decompression sickness. On April 12, 2018, after a nine day trial on the issue of damages, the jury returned a verdict finding that the plaintiff had suffered $2.2 million in damages, but that she had failed to mitigate $726, 000 of those damages. (See Docket No. 348). On April 19, 2018, this court entered judgment for the plaintiff, which included prejudgment interest at the rate of 12%, for a total judgment of $2, 271, 651.60. (See Docket No. 349).

         This matter is presently before the court on Boeing's “Motions to Amend the Judgment under Rule 59(e), New Trial under Rule 59(a), and JMOL under Rule 50(b)” (Docket No. 380) (“Motion for a New Trial”). After extensive briefing on this and other post-trial motions filed by the parties, [1] oral argument was heard on August 6, 2018. Thereafter, the parties requested leave to file post-hearing briefs. The final brief was filed on October 22, 2018 and the Motion for a New Trial is now ripe for consideration. For the reasons detailed herein, Boeing's Motion for a New Trial is DENIED.


         As an initial matter, Boeing challenges the jury award as excessive on the grounds that the evidence of pain and suffering did not support the award, and that Ms. Guzman's failure to mitigate mandates the conclusion that the award was excessive. After careful consideration, this court finds Boeing's arguments to be unpersuasive.

         A. Standard of Review

         This court “is obliged to review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and to grant remittitur or a new trial on damages only when the award ‘exceeds any rational appraisal or estimate of the damages that could be based upon the evidence before it.'” E. Mountain Platform Tennis, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., Inc., 40 F.3d 492, 502 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869, 872 (1st Cir. 1982)). Under this standard, an award of damages must stand unless it is “grossly excessive, inordinate, shocking to the conscience of the court, or so high that it would be a denial of justice to permit it to stand.” Correa v. Hosp. S.F., 69 F.3d 1184, 1997 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting Grunenthal v. Long Island R.R. Co., 393 U.S. 156, 159, 89 S.Ct. 331 (1968)). The burden on the party seeking remittitur or a new damages trial is a heavy one, and the jury's assessment of the appropriate damages award is entitled to great deference. Monteagudo v. Asociacion de Empleados del Estado Libre Asociado, 554 F.3d 164, 174 (1st Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); Toucet v. Mar. Overseas Corp., 991 F.2d 5, 11 (1st Cir. 1993). It goes without saying that “converting feelings such as pain, suffering, and mental anguish into dollars is not an exact science” and, consequently, the jury's assessment will be upheld so long as it “‘does not strike such a dissonant chord that justice would be denied were the judgment permitted to stand.'” Correa, 69 F.3d at 1198 (quoting Milone v. Moceri Family, Inc., 847 F.2d 35, 37 (1st Cir. 1988) (internal punctuation omitted)). A jury verdict should not be disturbed merely because it is extremely generous or because the court thinks that the damages are considerably less. Diefenbach v. Sheridan Transp., 229 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted). “[M]erely showing that the damage award is generous in comparison to other (hand-picked) cases is insufficient to warrant relief.” Correa, 69 F.3d at 1198.

         As noted above, the jury award was to compensate the plaintiff for PTSD, major depressive disorder and, to a lesser extent, decompression sickness. Ms. Guzman's symptoms of decompression sickness, namely headaches, general malaise, and fatigue, only lasted a few days, and there was evidence that any abnormalities in her brain could have been related to a number of different conditions. (Tr. III:45-48; VIII:109-11).[2] Moreover, there was evidence that any such abnormalities did not cause, and were not expected to cause, Ms. Guzman any continuing problems. (Tr. III:47-48). The parties agree that virtually all of the award had to be to compensate Ms. Guzman for her PTSD and major depressive disorder.

         According to the plaintiff, “in a survey of 1, 369 civil jury verdicts across all jurisdictions, two-thirds of plaintiffs received compensation for PTSD, and about one-third of those were awarded $1 million or more.” (Docket No. 390 at 34 & n.5). Similarly, courts have upheld damages in excess of $1 million for PTSD claims even absent significant physical injuries. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Am. Airlines (In re Air Crash at Little Rock Ark.), 291 F.3d 503, 512-13 (8th Cir. 2002) ($6.5 million jury verdict for severe PTSD but limited physical injuries following plane crash reduced to $1.5 million by Appeals Court in light of limitations on recovery imposed by the Warsaw Convention). “The reported cases reflect a broad range of verdicts for PTSD[, ]” including many in excess of $1 million. Webb v. TECO Barge Line, Inc., No. 07-514-DRH, 2012 WL 780851, at *31-32 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2012) (after bench trial, judge awards $2, 750, 000 for pain and suffering as a result of PTSD), and cases cited. This court recognizes that “[i]ndividual cases can differ from each other enormously in terms of witness credibility, the quality of presentation, the nature and extent of the injuries, the vulnerability of the victim, the reactions of jurors to the particular circumstances, and hosts of other variables.” Ibanez v. Velasco, No. 96 C 5990, 2002 WL 731778, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2002) (declining to reduce $2.5 million compensatory damage award in excessive force case despite fact that plaintiff's physical injuries were “not severe, ” because of plaintiff's significant emotional injuries, including PTSD). In the instant case, $2.2 million was awarded to compensate the plaintiff for her suffering for almost 8 years following the plane decompression, which the jury then reduced by approximately one-third.[3] While the award is probably higher than what this court would have awarded in a bench trial, as detailed below, this court finds that there was ample evidence that the plaintiff suffered severe PTSD and a major depressive disorder, that the reduction for failure to mitigate is supported by the record, and that there was no evidence that the jury acted out of any improper motive in awarding the damages. This court finds no basis to disturb the jury's award.

         B. The Evidence Supports the Award

         All of the experts, including Dr. Jhilam Biswas for the plaintiff, and Dr. Charles Marmar for the defendant, agreed that Ms. Guzman suffered from PTSD and major depressive disorder as a result of the decompression incident. (Tr. III:107; Tr. VII:70-71; 77-78). While Boeing argued that a substantial portion of Ms. Guzman's symptoms were attributable to the stress she suffered during her time as a student at MIT years earlier, and the fact that MIT was suing her for unpaid student loans, the jury apparently rejected this argument. There was ample evidence from which the jury could find that Ms. Guzman suffered from PTSD and a major depressive disorder as a result of the decompression incident, and that these conditions lasted through trial.

         Experience at MIT

         Since Boeing's theory focused on Ms. Guzman's time at MIT, some details are necessary. Ms. Guzman was from Costa Rica. (Tr. V:27). From 1995 through 2005 she attended MIT in Massachusetts. (Id. at 42, 67). She obtained a Master of Science degree in Civil Engineering in June 1998, and continued in a Ph.D. program in the department of Civil and Environmental Engineering. (See Tr. VII: 156-57; Tr. VIII:50). While at MIT, Ms. Guzman borrowed in excess of $100, 000 from MIT. (See Tr. VII:186).

         Candidates in a Ph.D. program at MIT have to pass a qualifying general examination before they are approved to start work on their Ph.D. thesis. (See id. at 156-57). It was undisputed that in 2000, Ms. Guzman began receiving official warnings that she had taken too long to take her general examination, although the reason for the delay was disputed. (See Tr. VII:155-60). Ms. Guzman eventually elected to take a medical leave of absence from MIT. (Tr. V:73-74). There was evidence in the record that during this period she was suffering from anxiety and depression that interfered with her ability to sleep or concentrate. (See Tr. VII:67-68, 77-78). Ms. Guzman made numerous visits to various doctors for complaints ranging from stress problems to concerns about fluctuating weight. (E.g. Tr. VII:65, 69, 78-79, 113). There was an unexplained reference in passing in her medical records that she was potentially suffering from PTSD, although she apparently was not diagnosed with that condition. (Tr. VII:164-68). Ms. Guzman tried an anti-depressant at the time, but it made her feel ill and she stopped taking the medication. (See Tr. IV:32, 119, 162-63). There was also evidence that there were family situations in Costa Rica that required her attention at that time, including her mother having suffered a stroke and her father having been assaulted. (Tr. V:73-76; VII:69, 160). During her leave, she went back to Costa Rica for at least a period of time. (Tr. V:74-75).

         Ms. Guzman returned from her medical leave in 2003. (Tr. VII:111). She continued with her studies, although she did again receive warnings of her need to take her general examination. (Tr. VII:173-75). In June 2005, she was denied further enrollment, as a result of which she could no longer pursue her Ph.D. at MIT. (Tr. VII:176). Ms. Guzman returned home. (Tr. V:82). As detailed more fully below, the plaintiff contends that after returning home she was leading a productive, social, engaging and happy life until the decompression incident. Boeing attempted to challenge this evidence, and contends that the court made evidentiary rulings which were in error.

         After leaving MIT, Ms. Guzman's student loans became due. (Id. at 97). She did not pay them. (See Tr. VII:184). In 2007, MIT sued Ms. Guzman. (Id. at 182). Ms. Guzman counter-claimed for, inter alia, MIT's refusal to allow her to finish her Ph.D. (Id. at 181-82, 185). At the time of the rapid decompression incident on October 26, 2010, Ms. Guzman was coming to Boston to be deposed in the MIT litigation. (Tr. V:98, 120). The deposition went forward as planned on October 27, 2010. (See id. at 120). The MIT trial was held in Boston in February 2011 and resulted in a verdict against her in the amount of $177, 000.00. (Tr. VII:186; VIII:27, 36-37). This court made a number of evidentiary rulings in connection with the admissibility of facts relating to the MIT litigation and statements made by the plaintiff in connection with the MIT dispute. Boeing was able to and did cross-examine Ms. Guzman extensively using statements she made in connection with the MIT litigation. (See, e.g., Tr. VII:195; VIII:36).

         It was Boeing's contention that Ms. Guzman's PTSD and major depressive disorder existed during her time as a student at MIT, and that her inability to complete her Ph.D. program and the stress of being sued by MIT were the cause of and/or exacerbated her continued psychiatric conditions. (See Tr. II:71-73). It was the plaintiff's contention that while her failure to complete her Ph.D. was a setback, it was not a debilitating event in her life. Neither was the MIT lawsuit. (See Tr. VII:184-86). Ms. Guzman contended that she was functioning well in Costa Rica until the decompression incident. (See Tr. V:140). The jury apparently rejected Boeing's theory. As detailed herein, there was ample evidence to support the jury's verdict.

         Evidence of Emotional Damages Following the Decompression Incident

         There was substantial evidence from which the jury could find that the decompression incident was a harrowing event. Ms. Guzman testified that there was a big, loud, explosion in the plane and that she felt like she had been kicked in the stomach or the chest. (Tr. V:102-103). The plane started falling very quickly and was shaking and rolling. (Id. at 103). There seemed to be smoke, and she felt wind coming into the plane, which indicated to her that there was a hole. (Id. at 104). Ms. Guzman could not get the oxygen mask on without assistance, and even with the mask on she felt like she could not breathe properly. (Id. 105-07). Ms. Guzman thought that she was going to die. (Id. at 103-04). This court recognizes that experts for both parties (Dr. Podros for the plaintiff and Dr. Hebben for the defendant) testified, based on symptom validity testing they had each conducted, that Ms. Guzman exaggerated her emotional state, both with respect to positive and negative emotions. (See Tr. IV:79-81; VII:59-60, 79-81; VIII:158). Nevertheless, Ms. Guzman was a very sympathetic and credible witness, and her testimony was corroborated. For example, Kathleen Dalton Shields, a flight attendant, testified that it sounded like a bomb explosion on board - there was a hiss, a gust of air, and the oxygen masks came down. Passengers panicked and were crying and asking if they were going to die. (Tr. V:13-17). Similarly, the deposition testimony of fellow passenger Gwendolyn Farrell and Cheryl Carnevale confirmed that there was panic and that the passengers were very frightened.

         Ms. Guzman began seeking help for the stress she was feeling almost immediately. She called her mother who promptly put her in telephone contact with Dr. Marilyn Cambronero, a clinical psychologist in Costa Rica. (Tr. VI:15-17). They first spoke on the morning of October 27, 2010, and Dr. Cambronero continued to treat Ms. Guzman up until the time of trial. Ms. Guzman was in crisis when they first spoke. (Id. at 20). Boeing has attempted to minimize the impact of the incident on Ms. Guzman over time, and argues that her concern was limited to situations where she had to fly. However, as detailed below, in addition to the plaintiff's own compelling testimony, her sister's testimony and the Doctor's treatment notes depicted someone who continued to suffer from severe stress, depression, anxiety, and other symptoms of PTSD that impacted her daily living up until the time of trial.

         Ms. Guzman clearly had difficulty recounting the decompression events at trial, and was obviously stressed and disturbed by having to recount her story. (E.g., Tr. V:108). She testified to feeling strange and being in a daze after the plane landed in Miami again, and then during the plane ride to Boston. (Id. 114-16). When she landed in Boston, she had “a big headache, ” and “was feeling very strange, very fatigued. I had the feeling that I was there but wasn't there completely.” (Id. at 117). She was crying and nervous and only wanted to call her mother. (Id.) Her mother put her in touch with Dr. Cambronero who helped calm her down. (Id. at 118-19).

         Ms. Guzman made it through the MIT deposition she had to come to Boston for, although she had difficulty concentrating. (Id. at 120-21). However, she found herself unable to pull herself together to return home as originally planned, and ended up staying in Boston for approximately three weeks - much longer than expected. (Id. at 130-31). While in Boston, she met with her fellow passenger, Miguel Morales, and she found it helpful to discuss the situation with someone else who had been through the same event. (Id. at 125-27). When she flew home, Ms. Guzman felt compelled to discuss her situation with the pilots of the two flights it took her to get home, to get reassurance from them. (Id. at 132-33).

         As Ms. Guzman testified, when she returned home, she thought that things would be fine, but instead she started having “very terrible memories, flashbacks of what had hap-pened, ” and she would wake up in the middle of the night crying and yelling. On occasion she would wake up gasping for air. She also lacked energy and started feeling very strange. There were days she could not get out of bed. (Id. at 134-37). She started seeing Dr. Cambronero promptly and found her helpful. (Id. at 134-35). She continued treatment with Dr. Cambronero up until the time of trial, and still got support and hope from her. (Id. at 143).

         Ms. Guzman testified that even at the time of trial, however, she still lacked the ability to concentrate and found herself unable to even get through reading a newspaper. (Id. at 142). She suffered from debilitating concerns, was very insecure and afraid, and there were times when the world just went pitch dark, which scared her. (Id. at 142, 151) Ms. Guzman testified to still suffering from severe headaches. (Id. at 143-44). Her social circle has disappeared, and she finds it difficult to interact normally with people around her. (Id. at 151). She has cut herself off from her friends in other countries since traveling is so difficult for her - she needs to take medication and has flashbacks when she has to get on a plane. (Id. at 151-52). Ms. Guzman testified that apart from when she has to fly, which is still extremely difficult, there has been some improvement over time, but she is still suffering. (Id. at 155-56). For example, there are fewer flashbacks, but they still occur. (Id. at 156). While Boeing has attempted to portray Ms. Guzman's condition as being limited to when she needs to travel, that was clearly not her testimony or the testimony of any of the plaintiff's witnesses. (See, e.g., Tr. VI:37-38, 47-48, 51-55, 65-68).

         Dr. Cambronero kept treatment notes that showed she met with Ms. Guzman frequently from the time of the incident through 2016. (See Pl. Ex. 4).[4] While some of her symptoms waxed and waned, Ms. Guzman continued to suffer from nightmares, fears, insomnia, problems with concentration, crying spells and a lack of interest in life. (E.g., Tr. VI:22, 28, 34, 48). She continued to suffer from panic attacks, depression and a great deal of anxiety. Ms. Guzman's symptoms were not limited to when she was getting on a plane, although that was a very stressful activity for her. (Id. at 32, 39-41). As Dr. Cambronero's notes indicate, Ms. Guzman and her family were very concerned about her at numerous other times as well. (E.g., id. at 48, 54-55). As of August 21, 2013, Dr. Cambronero was reporting that there were no signs of improvement, so that Ms. Guzman's symptoms were considered chronic. (Id. at 51-52). When she learned about the potential lawsuit on September 5, 2013, Ms. Guzman was relieved that she was not imagining the seriousness of the incident. (Id. at 52-53). In April 2014, Ms. Guzman's family was very worried because she did not want to leave the house, was despondent, and had some phobic-type fears of going out. (Id. at 54-55). These issues did not resolve up to the time of trial. (Id. at 43, 57-58, 65-67, 71-76). She continued to struggle with weight gain and her self-image. (Id. at 54, 58, 67, 71-72). Dr. Cambronero's testimony amply supported the conclusion that Ms. Guzman suffered from PTSD through the time of trial.

         The plaintiff also presented the testimony of Ms. Guzman's younger sister, Pabla Guzman. (Tr. V:57-72). In very compelling testimony, Pabla testified how Ms. Guzman changed from someone who took care of things for the family to someone who had to be taken care of.[5]Pabla testified that when Ms. Guzman came home from the trip to Boston in 2010, she was withdrawn, quiet, cried a lot and had nightmares. The family tore down walls in the home to create one big bedroom so that Ms. Guzman would not have to sleep alone, but could share her room with her much younger sisters. Ms. Guzman would have flashbacks and talk about things on the plane, and that the mask hadn't come down. Pabla further testified that, as of the time of trial, the family takes Ms. Guzman to the airport when she flies, and she takes medication to try and calm herself down. Pabla often flies with the plaintiff, who remains scared despite taking medication. On at least one occasion, Ms. Guzman has been unable to get on the plane at all. There are times when Ms. Guzman spends much of her time just lying down, and the family knows to leave her alone when she is feeling bad. According to Pabla, Ms. Guzman is no longer able to function as a mother figure in her life as she had before the incident, and Pabla is instead taking care of the plaintiff.

         The plaintiff also presented the testimony of Antonio Copete, who met Ms. Guzman while they both attended MIT, and they remained friends. (Tr. IV:49-70). He went on to obtain a Masters Degree and Ph.D. in physics from Harvard and he works as a research scientist in in the astronomy department. Dr. Copete was from Bogota originally, and he met Ms. Guzman when they were both involved in the Latin American student club at MIT. Ms. Guzman was very active in the club, and was a lead organizer of the first Latin American Conference at MIT. Dr. Copete testified that Ms. Guzman was well respected, happy and gregarious before the incident. After the incident, however, she was no longer the same person, and their relationship became more contentious.

         Ms. Guzman stayed with Dr. Copete after she arrived in Boston following the decompression incident. He testified that Ms. Guzman was distressed, frightened and very distraught. She stayed longer than expected and was very withdrawn. They continued to see each other once or twice a year after the decompression incident. When they saw each other after the incident, they fought more than they had before, and their relationship changed. He also noticed that she had gained weight. This credible witness testified that Ms. Guzman's personal-ity had changed after the incident. A jury could reasonably conclude that the changed behavior was consistent with the symptoms of PTSD and major depressive disorder, as described by the experts at trial.[6]

         Expert Testimony

         The plaintiff offered the testimony of Dr. Paul Wayne Buza, a Board-certified neurologist. (Tr. II:79). Dr. Buza opined that as a result of the decompression incident, Ms. Guzman suffered from PTSD with an underlying decompression illness. (Id. at 88). As noted above, the parties agree that Ms. Guzman's decompression illness, if any, was not a major factor in the damage award, and it will not be discussed further herein.

         The plaintiff offered the testimony of Dr. Jhilam Biswas, a Board-certified psychiatrist, who is nationally accredited in forensic psychiatry. (Tr. III:66-70). Dr. Biswas testified that it was her understanding that at MIT, Ms. Guzman was diagnosed with situational anxiety and depression, after which she returned home. (Id. at 91). Based, in part, on the fact that there was no evidence that Ms. Guzman sought any mental health treatment after returning to Costa Rica (before the decompression incident), Dr. Biswas concluded that Ms. Guzman rebounded from her situational anxiety and depression upon her return to Costa Rica, was functioning on a high level, and was very engaged and passionate about what she was doing. (Id. at 92-94).[7]

         Dr. Biswas opined that Ms. Guzman suffered from PTSD and co-morbid persistent depressive disorder as a result of the decompression incident. (Id. at 107-10). Her symptoms of PTSD included a decreased sense of self and loss of self-esteem, engagement in avoidance behavior, i.e., avoiding doing things that might make her relive the trauma, and hyper-vigilance - constantly worrying that another bad thing is about to happen again very soon. (Id. at 101-02). Ms. Guzman reported nightmares, flashbacks, a sort of “altered sensorium, feeling like the world was closing in on her, having tunnel vision, not seeing the world in any kind of way that she used to see it before the accident occurred.” (Tr. IV:28). She felt numb, and she sensed her environment differently. (Id. at 29). Her symptoms of depresssion included erratic eating issues and sleep disturbance, low mood over more than 3-4 days at a time in a week, low energy, low motivation, and a decrease in self-image and self-esteem. (Tr. III:108-09).[8] Ms. Guzman's distress over the incident lasted at least from the date of the incident on October 26, 2010 through the time she met with Dr. Biswas in 2016. (Id. at 105-06). Since the condition had lasted more than 2 years, it was deemed to be persistent. (Id. at 108-09).

         The defendant's expert, Dr. Charles Marmar, a PTSD expert, concurred in the diagnosis of Ms. Guzman as suffering from PTSD and chronic depression. (Tr. VII:59). While he acknowledged that some of her conditions were attributable to the decompression incident, he put part of the blame on events at MIT. As discussed in more detail infra, Dr. Marmar differed from Dr. Biswas in that he was more skeptical of the truthfulness of Ms. Guzman's testimony based on the symptom validity testing done by Dr. Podros (for the plaintiff) and Dr. Hebben (for the defendant). (Id. at 58-60). Such testing helps evaluate the accuracy of a patient's reporting about his or her condition. (Id. at 55). Dr. Marmar testified that Ms. Guzman had an unusual pattern of uneven self -reporting - under emphasizing the importance of certain things while over-emphasizing others - and that she was “actively managing the impression of her internal emotional state.” (Id. at 60). Nevertheless, as detailed infra, even considering the symptom validity testing, Dr. Marmar opined that Ms. Guzman suffered from PTSD and chronic depression caused at least in part by the decompression incident.

         The symptoms of PTSD, as described by Dr. Marmar, were consistent with the other witnesses' descriptions of Ms. Guzman, as well as Ms. Guzman's own testimony. For example, Dr. Marmar testified PTSD can affect a person's ability to concentrate, or to accomplish the same scope of work as before. (Id. at 107-08). It frequently makes someone more irritable in their relationships with others, and it can impact their sleep. (Id. at 108). Dr. Marmar summarized the symptoms of PTSD as follows:

The symptoms fall into four broad categories. The first category is referred to as reliving or re-experiencing painful aspects of the trauma, so that includes thoughts of the event, memories of the event, images of the event that intrude into a person's mind, it includes disturbing dreams of the event, which may be very realistic or simply fragmatic disturbing dreams that are associated with the event, it includes feelings of physical distress when reminded or triggered by a memory of the event. Those kinds of symptoms are generally classified as remembering, reliving or re-experiencing the event in ways that may be painful for the individual and frequently triggered by reminders. That's the first class.
The second broad class of symptoms are called avoidance symptoms, and they generally have to do with the fact that, when a person has been exposed to trauma, that confronting reminders of that trauma, whether it's talking about it, reading about it, visiting the site of the trauma, et cetera, may trigger back and bring back painful memories. So, avoidance symptoms are the tendency of the person who's traumatized to try to wall themselves off and isolate themselves from triggers that are reminders of the trauma.
The third class of symptoms have to do with alterations in thinking and feeling and views of the self and others; for example, seeing the world as a more dangerous and uncontrollable and unpredictable place and seeing oneself as weaker and more vulnerable, it may see alterations in mood, generally a loss of -- or a diminishment of positive emotions, such as love, affection, playfulness, joy and happiness, and a heightening of negative emotions, such as fear, sorrow, guilt, sadness. So, in PTSD, we find a heightening of negative emotions and a blunting of positive emotions, and those often occur with disturbances in to how one thinks and sees the world.
And then the final set of symptoms, which is the fourth category, are symptoms of abnormal heightened arousal. That's called hyperarousal. And typically they're things such as being watchful and on guard when there's no need to be, that's hypervigilance; being jumpy and easily startled; having trouble sleeping; being irritable; having a short fuse; having difficulty concentrating.

(Id. at 108-10). As detailed above, these symptoms match the testimony of Ms. Guzman and the other witnesses for the plaintiff.

         Dr. Marmar testified further that if someone has persistent and chronic PTSD, they have a 50% chance of developing a concurrent major depression at some time in the course of having PTSD, and that if they have a prior history of depression, they are more likely to develop recurrent depression in the context of having PTSD. (Tr. VII:101-02). As discussed infra, Dr. Marmar also opined that Ms. Guzman nevertheless has an excellent chance of being fully recovered in a finite period of time.

         Finally, Dr. Marmar gave more significance to the evidence of psychological stress Ms. Guzman experienced at MIT. His main conclusion was that:

Ms. Guzman experienced a traumatic event onboard this flight and has developed a post-traumatic stress disorder and that she has also suffered from chronic depression, both in relationship to this event and before when she struggled with depression during her years at MIT and that she also has a long history, which precedes this flight, of reporting herself to be physically unwell and reporting somatic disorders, a condition called somatization disorder.
So, within the limits that we have, given our still reliance primarily on taking at face value what people tell us about their symptoms, Ms. Guzman meets the diagnostic criteria currently, at the time of my assessment in July, 2016, of PTSD related to the airline incident of October 26th, 2010, of a chronic waxing and waning depression and somatization disorder.

(Id. at 58-59). After testifying about Ms. Guzman's response to symptom validity tests, Dr. Marmar further testified as follows:

Well, my conclusion is she did suffer from post-traumatic stress related to the airline incident and that, that is a significant factor in her life, but that must be placed in the context of having very significant problems which occurred before that event and color her response to it afterwards.
So, the main -- the diagnoses that I provided are, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, true for her. She did develop post-traumatic stress disorder related to the airline incident and some secondary depression, but that must be understood against the background of difficulty she had before the event and her own tendency to view the narrative of her life as --the main conclusion is, as she presents it, she had a wonderful life before the event, and the life was radically damaged by this incident. And I think a more accurate representation is she was having very significant psychological difficulties before this event, and this event has had an aggravating role.

(Id. at 70-71). On cross-examination, Dr. Marmar did confirm that the only event in Ms. Guzman's life about which he was aware that could formally be classified as a traumatic stressor was the decompression incident. (Id. at 120).

         In sum, there was ample expert evidence, both from the plaintiff's and defendant's expert, that as of the time of trial Ms. Guzman was suffering from PTSD and chronic depression as a result of the decompression incident, and that contrary to Boeing's characterization, the emotional distress she suffered significantly impacted her life.

         Life Before the Decompression Incident

         Admission of Photographs

          As noted above, it was Boeing's contention that the stress Ms. Guzman suffered at MIT from not completing her Ph.D. and being sued by MIT, was the cause of and/or exacerbated her PTSD and anxiety disorders. The plaintiff countered with evidence that during the period after MIT but before the decompression incident Ms. Guzman had an active life, and that she was social and not depressed. Ms. Guzman testified that before the incident she “was doing the things that normal people do, ” she was “happy” and “excited about life.” (Tr. V: 138). She exercised regularly, including doing aerobics, or kick-boxing, or running, or swimming. (Id.) She read a lot and ...

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