United States District Court, D. Massachusetts
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Talwani United States District Judge
9, 2018, Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems,
Inc. (“MERS”), along with JP Morgan Chase Bank,
N.A., removed to this court Plaintiff Bishop Ruben
DeWayne's Massachusetts state court complaint. Not.
Removal [#1]. On June 11, June 25, and August 17, 2018,
Plaintiff requested through various filings that this action
be remanded to the state court. Pl.'s Formal Not. Lack
Jurisdiction [#19]; Pl.'s 2d Formal Not. Lack
Jurisdiction [#23]; Pl.'s Judicial Estoppel & Demand
Not. & Demand Lack Jurisdiction [#25] (collectively,
“Plaintiff's Motions to Remand”). For the
reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's Motions to
Remand [#19, #23, #25] are DENIED.
Notice of Removal [#1] asserts that this court has
diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 as
this is a suit between citizens of different states and the
amount in controversy exceeds $75, 000. The
Complaint [#1-1] alleges that Plaintiff owns the
property at 53 Charlotte Street, Boston, Massachusetts, and
is domiciled in the winter months in South Carolina, and that
Defendant JP Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. and MERS are
foreign corporations with ties to states other than
Massachusetts and South Carolina. Plaintiff does not dispute
that the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied.
Accordingly, the court has subject matter jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
argues that remand is appropriate for a host of reasons,
including that: Defendants failed to timely serve their
answer on Plaintiff; Defendant JP Morgan Mortgage Acquisition
Corp. lacked standing to file a pre-foreclosure action in
Suffolk County Land Court; that JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.
improperly inserted itself and removed this case to this
court; that Defendant MERS's counsel filed an improper
civil case cover sheet; that the Massachusetts Superior Court
has exclusive jurisdiction over Chapter 93A claims; that the
transfer of the mortgage and note at issue in this case was
invalid; and that the district court is unfair, biased, and
partial against him.
Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.
Notice of Removal [#1] was filed on behalf of MERS
and JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., even though JP Morgan Chase
Bank, N.A., was not named in the Complaint [#1-1].
Defense counsel claimed that JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. had
been incorrectly named in the Complaint [#1-1] as JP
Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. Not. Removal 1 n.1 [#1].
After Plaintiff asserted that JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. had
improperly asserted itself in these proceedings, counsel
signed further filings on behalf of MERS, JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A., and JP Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. See
e.g., Defs.' Opp. Mot. Remand [#20]. Plaintiff
contends that JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. improperly inserted
itself in this dispute, and that removal without JP Morgan
Mortgage Acquisition Corp.'s participation was improper.
to the Corporate Disclosure Statement [#28],
Defendant JP Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. is a wholly
owned subsidiary of and separate entity from JP Morgan Chase
Bank, N.A. Moreover, in a related case, JP Morgan Chase Bank,
N.A. acknowledged that it was a separate legal entity from
the defendant named here. B. Ruben Dewayne v. First
Nat'l Bank of Arizona, No. 15-cv-14245-IT, No. 29 1
n.1 (D. Mass., filed March 1, 2016). As they are separate
legal entities, and JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. was not a
named party in this lawsuit, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.'s
assertion that Plaintiff improperly named another legal
entity, Defendant JP Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp., in
its lawsuit is erroneous. Rather, “plaintiff is master
of his complaint.” Negron-Fuentes v. UPS Supply
Chain Solutions, 532 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2018). JP
Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. has not filed a motion to intervene
or to be added as a party, and therefore is not a proper
party in this suit.
of this case by Defendant MERS and JP Morgan Chase Bank,
N.A., was therefore procedurally defective. However,
Plaintiff did not timely raise this discrepancy between the
party names. Section 1447(c) requires that “[a] motion
to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack
of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within
30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under
section 1446(a).” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (emphasis
added). As Plaintiff did not raise this procedural
discrepancy until June 11, 2018, more than thirty days after
the filing of the notice of removal on May 9, 2018, and he
has waived his argument that this defect is a proper basis
Chapter 93A Claim
contends that this matter must be remanded to the state court
from which it was removed because Plaintiff raised a claim
under Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 93A, § 2, for which the
Massachusetts Superior Court has exclusive jurisdiction.
Pl's Formal Not. Lack Jurisdiction ¶ 12 [#19].
is correct that the federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction, but this court has subject matter jurisdiction
over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Chapter 93A does
not state that claims brought under that chapter must be
litigated exclusively in state courts, and Plaintiff has
pointed the court to no case law suggesting as much. The case
law is to the contrary. See, e.g., Nascimento v.
Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 513 F.3d 273, 275-76 (1st Cir.
2008) (appeal of district court case denying summary judgment
of state law claims, including ch. 93A); Law Offices of
Joseph J. Cariglia, P.C. v. Jelly, 146 F.Supp.3d 251,
255 (D. Mass. 2015) (district court ...