TIMOTHY E. CICHOCKI & another 
TOWN OF REHOBOTH.
Polly Hwang, pro se.
P. Jacobson, Assistant Attorney General, for the Land Court
Timothy E. Cichocki, pro se, was present but did not argue.
R. Talerman, for town of Rehoboth, was present but did not
petitioners, Timothy E. Cichocki and Y. Dolly Hwang, appeal
from a judgment of a single justice of this court denying
their petition for relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3,
and for a writ of mandamus pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 5
(collectively, the "petition"). We affirm.
2007, the petitioners' property was foreclosed on a tax
lien; in 2009, on the motion of the town of Rehoboth (town),
a judge in the Land Court allowed the town to foreclose on
the petitioners' right of redemption. The Appeals Court
affirmed the judgment. See Rehoboth v.
Hwang, 7 8 Mass.App.Ct. 112 9 (2011). This court
denied the petitioners' application for further appellate
review. See 463 Mass. 1111 (2012) . The petitioners then
sought relief in the Federal courts. They also refused to
leave the property, and the town ultimately sought a
preliminary injunction to enjoin them from occupying the
property. After the petitioners' efforts in the
Federal courts were unsuccessful, they filed their petition
in the county court, asking the court to vacate the lower
court judgments; to order the town to return their house and
all of the personal property that was kept therein; and to
"[o]rder the Bristol County [district attorney] to
resume its investigation" of an "incident"
that occurred at their house in June, 2013. The single
justice denied the petition without a hearing.
their appeal to this court the petitioners continue to argue,
as they did in their various other court proceedings, that
they have been wronged by the town's actions in
foreclosing on their home. They assert that this court has
"mandamus jurisdiction" because "adequate or
effective remedies were not available elsewhere." That
the petitioners are unhappy with the results they received in
their other court cases does not mean, however, that those
remedies were inadequate. Relief under G. L. c. 211, §
3, is properly denied "where there are adequate and
effective routes . . . by which the petitioning party may
seek relief." Greco v. Plymouth
Sav. Bank, 423 Mass. 1019, 1019 (1996). Similarly,
"[r]elief in the nature of mandamus is extraordinary,
and is granted in the discretion of the court where no other
relief is available." Murray v.
Commonwealth, 447 Mass. 1010, 1010 (2006), citing
Forte v. Commonwealth, 429 Mass.
1019, 1020 (1999) .
petitioners have already obtained appellate review of the tax
lien foreclosure judgment, and to the extent that there were
other trial court judgments with which they were
dissatisfied, they could have done the same. Furthermore, any
effort by the petitioners to cast their current arguments as
"jurisdictional" appears to be nothing more than an
attempt to recast already-litigated issues. "Our general
superintendence power under G. L. c. 211, § 3, is
extraordinary and to be exercised sparingly, not as a
substitute for the normal appellate process or merely to
provide an additional layer of appellate review after the
normal process has run its course." Votta
v. Police Dep't of Billerica, 444 Mass.
1001, 1001 (2005).
single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in denying
 Y. Dolly Hwang.
 The petitioners also named the Land
Court and the Southeast Division of the Housing Court
Department as respondents. The courts are nominal parties
only. See S.J.C. ...