United States District Court, D. Massachusetts
ORDER ON MOTION FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT (DOC.
NO. 57) AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. NO.
Sorokin United States District Judge.
before the Court are a motion for default judgment against
Defendant Voyport II, LLC (“Voyport”) and a
motion for summary judgment against both Voyport and
Defendant Adam Conyers.
August 2014, Ferrara was hired by Voyport. Doc. No. 67 ¶
1. He was initially hired by Elizabeth Davenport, who held
the title of Vice President of Sales. Id. Conyers,
the Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) of Voyport,
completed and signed a “Contractor-Consulting
Agreement” (“the Contract”) on behalf of
Voyport. Id. ¶¶ 2-4. The Contract
describes Voyport's business as “provid[ing]
business customers with a full-featured, cost-efficient
international mobile voice roaming communications service
(‘Product'), using a combination of dedicated,
intelligent international data routing, existing smartphone
capabilities, and simplified business integration.”
Doc. No. 60-2 at 1. It further describes Ferrara's role
as “act[ing] as a direct business to business sales
representative” for Voyport. Id. It is
undisputed that during his work for Voyport, Ferrara
“reported directly to Elizabeth Davenport, ” the
Vice President of Sales. Doc. No. 67 ¶ 14.
paragraph titled “Independent Contractor, ” the
Contract states that Ferrara was “not an employee of
[Voyport], and that the relationship [was] that of an
independent contractor.” Doc. No. 60-2 at 2. The
Contract gave Ferrara the “right to promote the sale of
the Product and related services . . . through tactics deemed
appropriate by the Company, including but not limited to
personal and professional networks, referrals and
recommendations.” Id. at 3. It also included a
non-compete clause, which required Ferrara to “discuss
with [Voyport], in advance, any undertakings that are
contemplated, or in existence, to work for other companies
that could be considered competitors” to Voyport,
including a warning that the “failure to raise these
matters and obtain prior written consent from [Voyport] shall
constitute an automatic breach of this Agreement and
[Voyport] may immediately terminate this Agreement without
further notice.” Id. at 4. The Contract also
contained a provision which permitted Voyport to terminate
Ferrara without cause if it gave him 90 days written notice
or “90 days paid settlement in lieu of notice.”
Id. at 3.
2014, Voyport “had essentially run out of money.”
Doc. No. 63 ¶ 30. In October of that year, Ferrara began
sending periodic emails to Conyers noting that he had not yet
received any money for his services and asking when he should
expect to be paid. See Docs. No. 60-13 at 1-5, 60-7
at 1, 60-18 at 1. The first of these email inquiries is dated
October 1, 2014, Doc. No. 60-13 at 1, and the last is dated
March 26, 2015, Doc. No. 60-18 at 3. Ferrara asserts that he
was not paid for the services rendered from November 2014
through March 2015, his last five months with Voyport. Doc.
No. 67 ¶ 27. In April 2015, Conyers sent Ferrara a
proposed release for approximately $30, 000, reflecting
“the amount of consulting fees and other amounts due 
for the months of November 2014 through to March 2015,
” Doc. No. 60-16, which Ferrara declined, Doc. No.
60-15 at 1. Ferrara claims the following unpaid wages:
$5, 500 in base salary x 5 months = $27, 500
$250 in health insurance reimbursement x 5 months = $1, 250
$250 in commission bonuses x 4 months = $1, 000
$29.22 for business cards
$959.78 in late fees accrued by Ferrara
$5, 500 in base salary x 3 months = $16, 500
$250 in health ins. reimbursement x 3 months = $750
Doc. No. 58 at 9-11. Ferrara further argues that each of the
items listed above is subject to mandatory trebling by
has brought five claims: (1) violation of the Massachusetts
Wage Act; (2) violation of the Massachusetts Minimum Wage
Law; (3) retaliation; (4) breach of contract; and (5) unjust
enrichment. Doc. No. 1 at 13-14. The Court lacked personal
jurisdiction over VGH and two individual defendants, and
therefore dismissed all claims against those three
defendants. Doc. No. 30. In addition, the Court found that it
lacked personal jurisdiction over, and thus dismissed, the
breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims against
Conyers. Id. At this time, all five claims remain
against Voyport, and Counts I - III remain against Conyers.
February 2018, the Court allowed defense counsel's motion
to withdraw, and ordered Voyport to obtain successor counsel.
Doc. No. 53 at 1. The Court instructed Voyport that failure
to obtain a successor counsel might result in default
judgment. Id. To date, Voyport has not obtained
counsel. Accordingly, Ferrara has filed a motion for default
judgment against Voyport, in addition to a motion for summary
judgment against both Voyport and Conyers.
Court applies the familiar summary judgment standard. Summary
judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The Court is “obliged to view the
record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
and to draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving
party's favor.” LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins.
Co., 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st Cir. 1993). Even so, the Court
must ignore “conclusory allegations, improbable
inferences, and unsupported speculation.” Sullivan
v. City of Springfield, 561 F.3d 7, 14 (1st Cir. 2009).
moved for summary judgment on all remaining counts. Conyers
filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment.
Voyport, unrepresented, has not opposed. The Court addresses
the issues presented separately as to each defendant. Though
Voyport has not opposed the motion for summary judgment, the
Court considers the merits of the motion against Voyport. In
doing so, the Court considers Conyers's arguments
presented in his opposition briefs because the issues
presented overlap between the two defendants.
Count I ...