Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

United States v. Brown

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts

October 25, 2018

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
RONALD BROWN, Defendant.

          MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

          DENISE J. CASPER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

         I. Introduction

         Petitioner Ronald Brown (“Brown” or “Petitioner”) has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (the “Petition”), alleging several grounds for relief. D. 194 as amended by D. 198. The government opposes the Petition. D. 211. For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES the Petition.

         II. Standard of Review

          An incarcerated person may seek post-conviction relief under § 2255 if his sentence “(1) was imposed in violation of the Constitution; (2) was imposed by a court that lacked jurisdiction; (3) exceeded the statutory maximum; or (4) was otherwise subject to collateral attack.” David v. United States, 134 F.3d 470, 474 (1st Cir. 1998). It is Petitioner's burden to make out a claim for such relief. Id.

         III. Factual and Procedural Background

         On May 10, 2013, a jury returned a guilty verdict against Brown on all counts against him in the second superseding indictment, D. 102: Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Count I); using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count II); and being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count III). D. 118. On December 13, 2013, the Court sentenced Brown to 272 months in prison, a sentence consisting of 188 months as to Counts I and III (as a result of qualifying under the Armed Career Criminal Act, “ACCA, ” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), Brown was subject to a minimum mandatory sentence of 180 months on Count III) and 84 months as to Count II (Brown was subject to a consecutive, minimum mandatory sentence of 84 months under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii)) to run consecutively to the concurrent sentences on Counts I and II. D. 162. Brown filed a timely notice of appeal and the First Circuit affirmed the judgment on October 6, 2014. D. 163; D. 192. Brown has now filed the Petition, D. 194 as amended by D. 198, enumerating six[1] grounds for relief.[2]

         IV. Grounds for Relief

         Brown asserts several grounds for relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel (Grounds One through Three) and claiming that his conviction on the 924(c) charge, Count II, and his ACCA sentence on the 922(g)(1) charge, Count III, was improper (Grounds Five and Six). The Court will address each of these grounds in turn.

         V. Discussion

         A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims (Grounds One through Three)

         To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must show that: “(1) ‘counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness' and (2) ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'” United States v. Constant, 814 F.3d 570, 578 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984)).

         Reasonableness is viewed “as of the time of counsel's conduct.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Judicial scrutiny of a counsel's representation and performance must be “highly deferential” and the Court should make “every effort . . . to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, even deficient representation does not violate the Sixth Amendment if there was no actual prejudice. See United States v. McGill, 11 F.3d 223, 226 (1st Cir. 1993).

         To demonstrate prejudice, Petitioner must show “that there is a reasonable probability” that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, there would have been a different outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A “reasonable probability is one ‘sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.'” Johnston v. Mitchell, 871 F.3d 52, 64 (1st Cir. 2017), cert. ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.