Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Mehic v. Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, Inc.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts

August 31, 2018

SUADA MEHIC, Plaintiff,
v.
DANA-FARBER CANCER INSTITUTE, INC., MELISSA CHAMMAS and LINDA SWEENEY, Defendants.

          MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE (DOCKET ENTRY # 113)

          MARIANNE B. BOWLER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

         Pending before this court is a motion to strike filed by defendants Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, Inc. ("Dana-Farber"), Melissa Chammas ("Chammas"), and Linda Sweeney ("Sweeney") (collectively "defendants"). (Docket Entry # 113). Defendants seek to strike certain material from being used in consideration of their motions for summary judgment (Docket Entry ## 99, 101). (Docket Entry # 113). Plaintiff Suada Mehic ("plaintiff"), a former employee of Dana-Farber, opposes the motion. (Docket Entry # 118). After conducting a hearing, this court took the motion (Docket Entry # 113) under advisement.

         Defendants seek to strike all of the 78 exhibits attached to plaintiff's affidavit, a supplemental affidavit, plaintiff's five-paragraph LR. 56.1 statement of material facts ("plaintiff's LR. 56.1 statement") (Docket Entry # 109, p. 27), [1]the majority of the paragraphs in plaintiff's 53-page affidavit, and the following paragraphs in plaintiff's LR. 56.1 statement in response to defendants' LR. 56.1 statement ("plaintiff's LR. 56.1 response") (Docket Entry # 109, pp. 1-26): two, six, nine, ten, 11, 14 to 27, 30 to 31, 33, 36 to 39, 44 to 47, 49, 50, 51, 53, 57 to 59, 60 to 66, 68, 70, 72 to 78, 80, 83 to 98, 101, 104, 105, 107 to 115, 117 to 119, 121, 124 to 133, 135 to 140, 142, 146, 148, 149, and 150 to 155.[2] (Docket Entry ## 113, 114). Defendants primarily rely on Fed. R. Civ. P ("Rule 56(c)") and LR. 56.1 to strike the foregoing from the summary judgment record. They additionally submit that various affidavit paragraphs contradict plaintiff's deposition testimony and rely on hearsay. (Docket Entry ## 113, 114).

         Plaintiff's three-page opposition globally maintains that she responded to each paragraph in defendants' LR. 56.1 statement and cited to the record, including to her affidavit, exhibits, and the verified first amended complaint "in accordance with the rules." (Docket Entry # 118). She does not cite any legal authority, quotes four paragraphs from her first affidavit, and explains why she wrote on a number of emails filed as exhibits. She requests, "if necessary," that this court consider the supplemental affidavit for authentication purposes. (Docket Entry # 118). Notably absent from the opposition is a response to the above-noted arguments made by defendants or an explanation tailored to one or more paragraphs in either plaintiff's LR. 56.1 response or her affidavit that defendants seek to strike. As a result, plaintiff waives any argument not developed in her opposition.[3] See Curet-Velazquez v. ACEMLA de Puerto Rico, Inc., 656 F.3d 47, 54 (1st Cir. 2011) ("[a]rguments alluded to but not properly developed before a magistrate judge are deemed waived"); Coons v. Industrial Knife Co., Inc., 620 F.3d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 2010); Vallejo v. Santini-Padilla, 607 F.3d 1, 7 & n.4 (1st Cir. 2010) .

         DISCUSSION

         A. LR. 5 6.1

         Under LR. 56.1, a non-moving party admits any fact in the moving party's LR. 56.1 statement if the non-moving party fails to controvert the fact in the non-moving party's LR. 56.1 statement. See LR. 56.1. Defendants therefore seek to establish that the foregoing facts in plaintiff's LR. 56.1 response fail to controvert and therefore admit the facts in defendants' corresponding LR. 56.1 paragraphs. (Docket Entry # 114) .

         District courts "enjoy broad latitude in" administering and enforcing local rules. NEPSK, Inc. v. Town of Houlton, 283 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2002); United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 46 (1st Cir. 1989). As an anti-ferret rule, LR. 56.1 functions to focus a court's attention on the facts that are genuinely disputed. See Caban Hernandez v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007) (anti-ferret "rules are designed to function as a means of 'focusing a district court's attention on what is-and what is not-genuinely controverted'"); accord CMI Capital Market Investment, LLC v. Gonzalez-Toro, 520 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2008) (purpose of "rule is to relieve the district court of any responsibility to ferret through the record to discern whether any material fact is genuinely in dispute"); Mariani-Colon v. Dept. of Homeland Sec, ex rel. Chertoff, 511 F.3d 216, 219 (1st Cir. 2007).[4] As an anti-ferret rule, LR. 56.1 is designed "to reduce the burden on trial courts and 'prevent parties from unfairly shifting the burdens of litigation to the court.'" Advanced Flexible Circuits, Inc. v. GE Sensing & Inspection Technologies GmbH, 781 F.3d 510, 520-21 (1st Cir. 2015) (interpreting District of Puerto Rico local rule).

         In pertinent part, the rule requires the party opposing summary judgment to:

include a concise statement of material facts of record as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried, with page references to affidavits, depositions and other documentation . . . Material facts of record set forth in the statement required to be served by the moving party will be deemed for purposes of the motion to be admitted by the opposing parties unless controverted by the statement required to be served by opposing parties.

         LR. 56.1 (emphasis added). The language requires the non-moving party to provide citations to the record, i.e., "affidavits, depositions, or other documentation," with page references. LR. 56.1. The rule also deems admitted the facts in defendants' LR. 56.1 statement that plaintiff's LR. 56.1 response do not controvert. See Cochran v. Quest Software, Inc., 328 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2003) (plaintiff's failure to contest date in LR. 56.1 statement of material facts caused date to be admitted on summary judgment); Stonkus v. City of Brockton School Department, 322 F.3d 97, 102 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing LR. 56.1 and deeming admitted undisputed material facts that plaintiff failed to controvert). Although it is not always apparent whether the non-moving party complied with the rule with respect to a particular statement, a non-party's omission of citations to the record in its statement of facts "leaves no doubt" about its violation of the rule. See Zimmerman v. Puccio, 613 F.3d 60, 63 (1st Cir. 2010) ("defendants' failure to provide any citations whatsoever in their opposition statement leaves no doubt as to their noncompliance"). Paragraph six in plaintiff's LR. 56.1 response falls into this category inasmuch as it contains no citation to the summary judgment record. The fact set out in paragraph six of defendants' LR. 56.1 statement is therefore deemed admitted. Plaintiff's LR. 56.1 response to paragraphs 139 and 140 of defendants' LR. 56.1 statement cites only to "Mehic Responses, supra," a category that includes approximately 100 paragraphs in plaintiff's affidavit. The facts set out in paragraphs 139 and 140 of defendants' LR. 56.1 statement are therefore deemed admitted.[5] Although defendants challenge plaintiff's LR. 56.1 response to the facts set out in paragraphs 151, 153, and 154 of defendants' LR. 56.1 statement, plaintiff's response denotes the paragraphs as "undisputed" and does not provide a citation to the record. The facts in paragraphs 151, 153, and 154 of defendants' LR. 56.1 statement are not controverted in plaintiff's response and therefore deemed admitted. See LR. 56.1.

         Overall, this court may strike a fact in plaintiff's LR. 56.1 response and deem admitted the facts in defendants' corresponding LR. 56.1 paragraph when the response paragraph either does not provide an adequate citation to the record or controvert defendant's corresponding LR. 56.1 paragraph. See LR. 56.1. With respect to the latter, in the event a paragraph in plaintiff's LR. 56.1 response cites solely to an affidavit paragraph that does not address (and therefore does not "controvert") the facts set out in the defendants' corresponding LR. 56.1 paragraph, those facts are deemed admitted. See LR. 56.1. Similarly, in the event this court strikes the affidavit paragraph that is the only citation provided to support a paragraph in plaintiff's LR. 56.1 response, the facts in the corresponding paragraph of defendants' LR. 56.1 are deemed admitted. See generally LR. 56.1. Finally, if this court strikes only a portion of the affidavit paragraph that is the only citation provided to support the LR. 56.1 response and the facts in the remaining portion do not address (and therefore do not controvert) the facts in the corresponding paragraph in defendants' LR. 56.1 statement, those facts are deemed admitted.

         Adhering to the foregoing framework and examining each paragraph in plaintiff's LR. 56.1 response and the cited, supporting affidavit paragraphs that defendants seek to strike, the following paragraphs in plaintiff's LR. 56.1 response do not sufficiently controvert the facts in the corresponding paragraphs in defendants' LR. 56.1 statement: two, six, nine, ten, 11, 14 to 18, 19 (sent. 1), 20 to 27, 30, 31, 33, 36 to 39, [6] 44 to 47, 49, [7] 50 to 51, 53, 57 to 59, 60 to 66, [8] 68, 70, 72 to 78, 80, 83 to 97, 101, 104, 105, 108 to 115, 117 to 119, 121, 124 to 132, 135, [9] 136, 137, 146, and 148 to 154.

         As a result, the facts in the above paragraphs in defendants' LR. 56.1 statement are deemed admitted for purposes of summary judgment. The basis for deeming the facts in these paragraphs admitted is further explained, in part, in the succeeding sections.

         B. Affidavit Statements Based on Speculation, Belief, and Unsupported Characterizations

         Relying on Rule 56(c) (4), defendants seek to strike a number of facts in plaintiff's LR. 56.1 response (Docket Entry # 109) and the cited paragraphs in plaintiff's affidavit (Docket Entry # 110) because they rely on argument, speculation, personal beliefs, and rhetorical questions.[10] (Docket Entry ## 114, 125). The LR. 56.1 facts in plaintiff's statement (Docket Entry # 109) that defendants seek to strike (along with the cited paragraphs of the affidavit) are: two, six, ten, 11, 14 to 17, 18, [11] 20 to 27, 30, 31, 33, 44 to 47, 50, 51, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 68, 70, 74 to 78, 80, 83, 84 to 97, 107 to 112, 115, 117, 118, 119, 121, 124 to 133, 135 to 140, 146, 148, 149, and 150 to 155.[12] jn response, plaintiff summarily asserts that she provided "amply alleged facts that would defeat Summary Judgment." (Docket Entry # 118) .

         "[U]nsupported, speculative assertions," and conclusory statements in an affidavit submitted in opposition to summary judgment do not create a genuine or a material fact sufficient to warrant proceeding to trial. Garmon v. Natl. R.R. Passenger Corp., 844 F.3d 307, 315 (1st Cir. 2016); see Mendez-Aponte v. Bonilla, 645 F.3d 60, 68 (1st Cir. 2011) ("agree[ing] with the district court that the plaintiffs' . . . statement of contested material facts consist[s], in large part, of speculation and conclusory allegations for which the only evidentiary support is Mendez-Aponte's sworn affidavit, which itself contains conclusory allegations"). For example, affidavit statements reflecting a plaintiff's "subjective speculation," such as that another employee's higher wages resulted from discrimination, are insufficient. Quinones v. Buick, 436 F.3d 284, 290 (1st Cir. 2006) (discounting plaintiff's affidavit which, "like his deposition testimony, reflects only Quinones' subjective speculation and suspicion that Barnes' greater earnings must have resulted from discrimination"). Similarly, statements that are argumentative or amount to "mere unsupported characterizations," personal opinions, or "subjective beliefs" do not create a triable issue. Garcia-Garcia v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 878 F.3d 411, 425 (1st Cir. 2017) (plaintiff "provides no detail and no support other than his subjective belief that he was being discriminated against by Costco"); Quinones v. Buick, 436 F.3d at 290-91. For example, statements in an affidavit that reflect the plaintiff's "'subjective speculation and suspicion[]' that her termination was due to discriminatory animus" along with her "'unsupported characterizations' are insufficient to create a triable issue of fact." Ashley v. Paramount Hotel Group, Inc., 451 F.Supp.2d 319, 334 (D.R.I. 2006) (quoting Quinones v. Buick, 436 F.3d at 290-91). As explained in a recent, First Circuit decision:

A court need not "take at face value" a party's "subjective beliefs," even if offered in the form of testimony, if those subjective beliefs are "conclusory," "self-serving," and lack factual support in the record. Torrech-Hernandez v. Gen. Elec. Co., 519 F.3d 41, 47 n.l (1st Cir. 2008). This is such an instance: Irobe's unsupported opinion about the limited availability of particular merchandise in the Lewiston area is simply not a game-changer in the summary judgment calculus.

Irobe v. U.S. Dept. of Agric, 890 F.3d 371, 381 (1st Cir. 2018).

         Here, paragraph two in plaintiff's LR. 56.1 response relies exclusively on affidavit paragraph two. In accordance with the foregoing law, the latter is stricken from the summary judgment record. In addition, the facts in paragraph two in defendants' LR. 56.1 statement are deemed admitted.

         Furthermore, statements in an affidavit "must be made on personal knowledge." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) (emphasis added). "Statements made upon information and belief, as opposed to personal knowledge, are not entitled to weight in the summary judgment balance." Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957, 961 (1st Cir. 1997) (disregarding affidavit statement that began with, "I believe that") (emphasis in original). Separately, affidavit statements "blatantly contradicted by the record" do not create a genuinely disputed material fact. Medina-Rivera v. MVM, Inc., 713 F.3d 132, 140 (1st Cir. 2013) (ignoring plaintiff's deposition testimony that she did not work certain hours when earnings statements and her statement of material facts said otherwise).

         With respect to affidavit paragraph six, there is no indication that plaintiff has personal knowledge that Irina Michlin ("Michlin") "was first hired to the position of Accounting Clerk." (Docket Entry # 110, ¶ 6). As also argued by defendants, plaintiff's statement about what Michlin said to plaintiff is hearsay. See Evergreen Partnering Group, Inc. v. Pactiv Corp., 832 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2016) ("hearsay evidence cannot be considered on summary judgment 'for the truth of the matter asserted'"). Affidavit paragraph six is therefore not considered part of the summary judgment record. Paragraph ten in plaintiff's LR. 56.1 response relies on affidavit paragraph six. The fact in paragraph ten in defendants' LR. 56.1 statement is therefore deemed admitted. The same ruling and reasoning apply to affidavit paragraph seven and paragraph 11 of defendants' LR. 56.1 statement.[13]

         Defendants also object to considering affidavit paragraphs nine through 12 (Docket Entry # 114, pp. 4-5, 7-12), cited to support paragraphs 14 to 19 in plaintiff's LR. 56.1 response.[14] These affidavit paragraphs include appropriate facts as well as inappropriate speculation, argument, and/or personal beliefs or opinion. The following underlined portions of affidavit paragraphs nine through 12 contain appropriate facts whereas the remaining text contains inappropriate personal beliefs, speculation, hearsay, and/or argument:

9. In response to Defendants' asserted Statement of Fact Nos. 16, 17, and 19, know that with this e-mail from Connolly, it was intended only to manipulate me. E-mails, true and correct copies of which are attached hereto, show[] that management had information that the Zakim Center moved to a new building at least three months in advance. Zakim Center started working and providing service since 1999.[15] I started working overtime in the first half of 2005. This means that my overtime was not at all related to Zakim Center patients. At that time, I also received payments from Excess Management until mid-2013. Overtime was about working with regard to the increasing Petty Cash distribution from $1000 to $3000, and other services related to my work responsibilities. The first patients of Zakim Center went to the treatment and then paid the services after the treatment.[16] From this attached e-mail sent from Steve Connolly, you can see pure discrimination and humiliation by not including me in a conversation about his proposal. They did not think about the promotion they had promised me for years, in this way they wanted to scare and humiliate me. As I gave several times, the statement I did not mind to stop working overtime, [17] but I was automatically against how George Peddle at that time my manager and manager for General Accounting presented an order from Melissa Chammas that I was stealing overtime, and that I will suffer serious consequences for doing that.[18] To my question what about my promotion that was agreed in 2010, George Peddle told me that Human Resources had lost my documentation.[19] I then told him that I would immediately go to the HR and report these very embarrassing and humiliating words from my manager. If there was no need to come in at 8:45 AM, why did George Peddle change my working time even to come up fifteen minutes earlier at 8:30 AM. When I started working, I was hired to begin at 9:00 AM and work to 5:00 AM. I never had high pressure registered but very high blood pressure was measured in OHS after this conversation about my overtime. In OHS I did not mention what happened to me. (Now that I have seen this e-mail now, it is clear to me that Steve is involved in this dirty business from the beginning of a false accusation, if not before.
10. In response to Defendants' asserted Statement of Fact Nos. 14 and 15, know that at the time that the Zakim patients business was moved, although I did not work anymore with patients, I received a new responsibility to receive from two to three deposits from these departments in the morning and also to provide a fund for exchanging large bills in lesser value. This was a more responsible and more comprehensive job then receiving patient's payment, which, in this case, means one job is taken away (the Zakim work) and replaced with a much more comprehensive and responsible job. Thus, the Zakim move was merely a false excuse, now created by Defendants to justify, falsely, the removal of overtime.
11. In response to Defendants' asserted Statement of Fact No[]. 18, know that all overtime worked by Plaintiff was authorized.[20] Furthermore, the threat by Chammas to Plaintiff that Plaintiff was going to suffer consequences for working her authorized overtime, is worse than discipline. Finally, by going to HR with the presentation of what and how Plaintiff was accused falsely on 02/07/2012 with working unauthorized overtime, [21] Plaintiff prevented her[self] from being falsely disciplined, only on the basis of a misrepresentation from management. The false accusation was part of a plan or scheme by Defendants to "paper" Plaintiff's personnel folder, and to use it against her when needed, if she were asking for her promotion, which had been promised her for years. For Defendants to assert now, on their own behalf, that Plaintiff never was disciplined for working unauthorized overtime is duplicitous.
12. In response to Defendants' asserted Statement of Fact No. 19, know that I did not go to HR because of elimination of overtime, I went because of the false accusation that I was stealing overtime and that I would have serious consequences.[22] To my question about my promotion that is being held from 2008/2010 that same moment, Peddle told me that HR lost the documentation sent by Melissa Chammas about my promotion. That moment I told him that I would go ASAP to HR to report false accusation and also to check that management has ever sent documentation of my promotion. Elizabeth Dean told me that they never received any documentation of my promotion. It was all clear to me what they wanted to achieve with a false accusation.

(Docket Entry # 109, ¶¶ 9-12).

         The foregoing, underlined portions of the above paragraphs, cited to support paragraphs 14 to 19 in plaintiff's LR. 56.1 response, do not controvert the facts in the corresponding paragraphs 14 to 18 and the first sentence in paragraph 19 in defendants' LR. 56.1 statement. As a result, the facts in these paragraphs of defendants' LR. 56.1 statement are deemed admitted. With respect to paragraph 18, plaintiff cites affidavit paragraphs nine to 12 as disputing the facts in paragraph 18. (Docket Entry # 109, ¶ 18). The affidavit paragraphs do not controvert paragraph 18 in defendants' LR. 56.1 statement because the latter concerns the fact that plaintiff was not disciplined for working unauthorized overtime. As to paragraph 19, the first sentence simply recounts that plaintiff requested a meeting with HR. As to the second sentence in paragraph 19, plaintiff's deposition testimony establishes that she met with Dean and discussed her overtime. Construing the record in plaintiff's favor, the cited deposition testimony that supports the second sentence of paragraph 19 does not depict that plaintiff discussed a complaint about the elimination of her overtime but rather discussed the related topic of how plaintiff could "know [she] had to stop [working] overtime."[23] (Docket Entry # 98-1, p. 23).

         Separately, affidavit paragraph five is stricken for the reasons set out by defendants (Docket Entry # 114, pp. 5-6), except for the factual statement that, after the job opening for a staff accountant position in 2006, plaintiff "asked Beth to find anything" (Docket Entry # 110, ¶ 5, In. 6). Affidavit paragraph five, cited to support paragraph nine in plaintiff's LR. 56.1 response, therefore, does not adequately controvert the facts in paragraph nine of defendants' LR. 56.1 statement, which are deemed admitted.

         Defendants also move to strike the cited paragraphs in plaintiff's affidavit and the cited "related [e]xhibits" that support paragraphs 20 to 27 in plaintiff's LR. 56.1 response. (Docket Entry # 113). The cited, affidavit paragraphs are three, 13, 14, 15, 17, and 18. Defendants argue that they depict plaintiff's opinions, rhetorical questions, and arguments. (Docket Entry # 114, pp. 4-5, 7-12).

         The following statements in affidavit paragraph 13 are not stricken inasmuch as they are based on plaintiff's personal knowledge as opposed to her subjective beliefs or opinions: a large promotion occurred in 2011; plaintiff was the only employee "left out without a promotion"; and plaintiff's recitation of what she told Barberio. The remaining portion of affidavit paragraph 13 is stricken. The affidavit paragraph, as modified, does not controvert the facts in paragraph 20 of defendants' LR. 56.1 statement thereby deeming those facts admitted.

         As to affidavit paragraph 14, cited as the only support for paragraph 21 in plaintiff's LR. 56.1 response, plaintiff has personal knowledge about the subject matter of what she discussed during her February 2012 meeting with Dean, namely, whether "HR lost or received any documents about [plaintiff's] promotion."[24] (Docket Entry # 110, ¶ 14) . The remainder of affidavit paragraph 14 is stricken. First, defendants aptly object to the third sentence ("Dean informed me that the HR did not receive any documentation regarding my promotion") (Docket Entry # 110, ¶ 14) as hearsay.[25] Second, the remaining portions of the affidavit paragraph consist of plaintiff's arguments, opinions, and subjective belief regarding why she received the promotion and why "Chammas made misrepresentations." (Docket Entry # 110, ¶ 14). Finally, affidavit paragraph 14 does not controvert the fact in paragraph 21 of defendants' LR. 56.1 thereby deeming the fact admitted.

         Affidavit paragraph 15 is stricken as containing argument, speculation, and subjective beliefs about the quality of plaintiff's work. The only portion not stricken is the statement that, "I got an increase in the hourly pay and my grade [was] changed from 12 to 14." (Docket Entry # 110, ¶ 15). The paragraph does not controvert the fact in paragraph 22 of defendants' LR. 56.1 thereby deeming the fact admitted.

         Affidavit paragraph 17 is likewise stricken as containing argument, opinions, speculation, and subjective beliefs that Chammas "used her authority" against plaintiff "to hide her very dirty intentions to set [plaintiff] up to be fired." (Docket Entry # 110, ¶ 17). The only portion not stricken is the statement that, "I said to George Peddle . . . that this is not a good Review . . .." (Docket Entry # 110, ¶ 17). In addition, the paragraph does not controvert the fact in paragraph 25 of defendants' LR. 56.1 thereby deeming the fact admitted.

         Paragraph three of plaintiff's affidavit, cited in support of paragraph 26 in plaintiff's LR. 56.1 response, includes a list of plaintiff's responsibilities as a cashier. Plaintiff has personal knowledge about the responsibilities and this portion of affidavit paragraph three is not stricken. The remaining portion of the paragraph, however, consists of conclusory and/or personal opinions, such as "[m]anagement just expended and added new responsibilities," and plaintiff worked "without complaint." (Docket Entry # 110, ¶ 3). The remaining portion is therefore stricken from the record.

         Defendants seek to strike 78 more paragraphs in plaintiff's affidavit on the basis that plaintiff lacks personal knowledge and/or they consist of speculation, subjective beliefs, personal opinions, inadmissible argument, and rhetorical questions. In the interest of expediency, below is a list of the statements in the affidavit paragraphs that are stricken because plaintiff lacks personal knowledge or they contain argumentative or conclusory statements, speculation, "subjective belief[s]," and/or "unsupported opinion." Irobe v. U.S. Dept. of Agric, 890 F.3d at 381; Garcia-Garcia v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 878 F.3d at 425; Garmon v. Natl. R.R. Passenger Corp., 844 F.3d at 315; Mendez-Aponte v. Bonilla, 645 F.3d at 68; Quinones v. Buick, 436 F.3d at 290. Specifically, in accordance with defendants' arguments, the following affidavit paragraphs or portions thereof are stricken from the summary judgment record: the portion of affidavit paragraph 18 that reads, "on that Review I was presented as a problem for Finance"; affidavit paragraphs 21, 22, 23, [26] 32, 43, 45, 48, 50, 53, 61, 64, 66, 68, 81, 84, [27] 89, 93, 94, [28] 96, 99, [29] 100, and 101[30] in their entirety.

         Portions of the following affidavit paragraphs are also stricken: paragraph 26;[31] paragraph 27;[32] paragraph 28 except for the statement that plaintiff reported to Peddle and, in his absence, to Chammas; paragraph 29 except for plaintiff's recitation of what plaintiff said and personally observed, including the seventh sentence;[33] paragraph 33 except for plaintiff's description of what she did after the meeting and her statement of not being informed "that Steve Connolly, the Finance Director, would attend the [June 21, 2013] meeting"; paragraph 35 except for the first sentence;[34] paragraphs 37 and 38 to the extent they contain hearsay; paragraph 40 except for the fifth and sixth sentences and plaintiff's recitation that she sent certain emails and telephoned a "Hot Line";[35] paragraph 41 except for the third sentence; paragraph 42 except for the fifth sentence; paragraph 44 except for the first sentence that plaintiff replied to "Chammas after [plaintiff's] working hours"; paragraph 46 except for the statements that she "prepared, counted and manually entered everything," she "completely finished" the job, and she "finished it all";[36]paragraph 49 except for the fourth sentence;[37] paragraph 52 except for plaintiff's descriptions of the cash register and her efforts to repair it, her descriptions of her own conduct, her observations, and her own statements of what she said to others;[38] paragraph 54 except for the twelfth sentence as to what plaintiff told a number of other coworkers;[39] paragraphs 55 and 56 except for plaintiff's statements about what she said, what she observed, and what she did;[40] paragraph 58 except for the limited portion that contains what plaintiff specifically said and what she did; paragraph 60 except for the seventh sentence that Dean escorted plaintiff to the exit, including what plaintiff said to Dean at that time, and that plaintiff sent an email to Chammas; paragraph 63 except for the recitations of plaintiff's responsibilities and work duties in the first sentence, the first clause of the second sentence, the third sentence, a portion of the fourth sentence, and the increased responsibilities in the thirteenth sentence;[41] paragraph 67 except for the first, fifth, and sixth sentences; paragraph 69 except for the first and fifth sentences, the portion of the seventh and eighth sentences that Chammas said "the word 'Communicate'"[42] and "pronounced it in a way" that mocked an individual such as plaintiff "who has English as a second language", [43] and the sentence as to being sent home; paragraph 70 except for the portion that depicts plaintiff's slip and fall; paragraph 79 except for what plaintiff said, what she observed, and what she did; paragraph 80 except for plaintiff's statements as to what she said and did as well as what she witnessed;[44]paragraph 82 except for the second sentence;[45] paragraph 83 except the second sentence to the extent that plaintiff has personal knowledge of the matter, portions of the ninth and eleventh sentences to the extent they depict what plaintiff personally observed, and the thirteenth sentence;[46] paragraph 87 except for what plaintiff told her physician during a January 9, 2014 visit, the fact that he gave her a list of doctors relative to her psychological health, and that she sent an email to Chammas requesting a day off; paragraph 88 except for sentences two, five, seven, eight, and 11; paragraph 91 except for sentences one and three;[47] paragraph 95 except for sentences two, three, and six;[48] paragraph 97 except for sentences two to five, seven, and ten to 13, the first clause in sentence 14, and the last two sentences;[49] paragraph 98 except to the extent that plaintiff told Sweeney that she (plaintiff) could not do the filing because her hands hurt and she had to finish paperwork, she was "too tired from my work place, and" she was "doing everything by myself";[50] paragraph 102 except for the statement that plaintiff "informed everyone in OHS of my departure"; paragraph 103 except for plaintiff's recitation of what she said, what she personally observed, and what she did; paragraph 104 except to the extent it recites what plaintiff said to others, who she told about the reviews, what she observed or witnessed, and what she did;[51] paragraph 105 except to the extent plaintiff has personal knowledge that an individual(s) hired as a cashier or a staff accountant was, in fact, younger in age than plaintiff;[52] paragraph 106 except for sentence six for a limited purpose, [53] the timing of the first invitation to the Dana-Farber Christmas party, what plaintiff told Peddle, and the averment that Michlin "was not promoted for five years" albeit only to the extent of plaintiff's personal knowledge; paragraph 109 except for plaintiff's recitation about the visit to "the FMLA office," her high blood pressure, the loss of sleep, other mental health difficulties, and taking a day off in order to meet with a physician;[54] paragraph 111 except for plaintiff's statement that "I stopped thinking about the job as my priority";[55] paragraph 112 except for the fact that she received paperwork during the visit to the FMLA office, and that she lost her health insurance and "had to wait for new insurance"; paragraph 113 except for the portion of sentence four that plaintiff "did not report this as overtime," sentence seven to the extent of plaintiff's personal knowledge, the first clauses in sentences ten and 11 that Wong stayed with plaintiff "for about two or three hours," sentence 16 that her work increased after she was hired, sentence 18 to the extent it describes a January 14, 2014 email, [56] the description of Deborah Hicks' email in sentences 19 and 21, [57] the description of Chammas' email in sentence 23, [58] and the portion of sentence 25 that plaintiff did not receive her "new responsibilities" for her work at 10BP.[59]

         C. Deposition Testimony

         As previously indicted, defendants seek to establish facts in a number of paragraphs in their LR. 56.1 statement as uncontroverted and therefore admitted because plaintiff cannot create a dispute in her affidavit that contradicts her deposition testimony. The paragraphs in defendants' LR. 56.1 statement are: 9, 11, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 26, 49, 53, 73, 96, 97, 98, 101, 104, 105, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 121, 124, 125, 126, 128, 129, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 142, 146, and 148. Having already made rulings on a number of these paragraphs and found them uncontroverted, it is only necessary to address the remaining paragraphs with respect to defendants' uncontroverted argument.

         Defendants also move to strike the affidavit paragraphs used to controvert the facts in these same paragraphs in defendants' LR. 56.1 statement on the basis that the affidavit paragraph contradicts plaintiff's deposition testimony. Here again, it is only necessary to address this argument as it applies to the affidavit paragraphs ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.