Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.
Extradition and Rendition.
Calzado appeals from a judgment of the county court denying,
without a hearing, his petition for relief under G. L. c.
211, § 3, on the ground that he has an adequate remedy
in the normal appellate process. In December, 2004, Calzado
was indicted for a murder that occurred in Fitchburg earlier
that year, and a warrant issued for his arrest. In 2006,
Calzado was located serving a sentence in the Dominican
Republic. At the expiration of that sentence, Calzado was
extradited to the United States, pursuant to an extradition
treaty, to be tried on the murder indictment. After his
arraignment on that charge, Calzado was indicted on a further
charge of witness tampering, based on his alleged conduct
during his imprisonment in the Dominican Republic. Calzado
moved to dismiss the witness tampering indictment on the
ground that the rule of specialty, see United States v.
Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886), prohibited his being
tried for any offense other than the murder indictment for
which he was extradited. A judge in the Superior Court denied
the motion on the ground that Calzado lacked standing to
object to an illegal or defective extradition. See
Commonwealth v. Diaz, 431 Mass. 822, 827 (2000)
("only the foreign government has standing to assert a
flaw in the extradition proceedings"). Calzado's G.
L. c. 211, § 3, petition ensued.
case is before us on Calzado's memorandum and appendix
pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301
(2001), which requires a party challenging an interlocutory
ruling of the trial court to "set forth the reasons why
review of the trial court decision cannot adequately be
obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the
trial court or by other available means." Calzado has
not satisfied his burden under the rule. "We have said
repeatedly that '[t]he denial of a motion to dismiss in a
criminal case is not appealable until after trial, and we
have indicated many times that G. L. c. 211, § 3, may
not be used to circumvent that rule. Unless a single justice
decides the matter on the merits or reserves and reports it
to the full court, neither of which occurred here, a
defendant cannot receive review under G. L. c. 211, § 3,
from the denial of his motion to dismiss.'"
Cepeda v. Commonwealth, 478 Mass. 1018, 1019 (2018),
quoting Bateman v. Commonwealth, 449 Mass. 1024,
1024-1025 (2007). We have recognized a very limited exception
"where a motion to dismiss raises a double jeopardy
claim of substantial merit." Wassilie v.
Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 1033, 1034 (2017), quoting
Watkins v. Commonwealth, 469 Mass. 1006, 1006
(2014). That exception does not apply here. Calzado argues
that the Superior Court lacks jurisdiction to try him for any
offense other than the one for which he was extradited or for
any offense that he allegedly committed while in the
Dominican Republic. Questions of jurisdiction are routinely
addressed on direct appeal after a final judgment. See
Salomon S.A. v. LaFond, 463 Mass. 1003,
1003 (2012) (ordinary appellate process "is not per se
inadequate to vindicate a claim of lack of personal
jurisdiction"; extraordinary relief properly denied).
Calzado has not shown that this is an inadequate remedy or
that he is asserting a "right not to be tried" akin
to a double jeopardy claim. See, e.g., Forlizzi v.
Commonwealth, 471 Mass. 1011, 1013 (2015).
also argues that if the witness tampering indictment is not
dismissed, the evidence supporting that indictment would be
used against him as to the murder charge.Again, if there is
any impropriety in the admission of evidence, an adequate
remedy is available in the ordinary course of appeal. The
fact that, as Calzado argues, this process might be
time-consuming and the outcome uncertain does not render the
remedy inadequate. The single justice did not err or abuse
her discretion by denying extraordinary relief.
affirmed. The case was submitted on the papers filed,
accompanied by a memorandum of law.
Bosk for the petitioner.
 While we do not decide the issue, we
note that it is hardly clear that dismissing the witness
tampering indictment would prevent this use of witness
tampering evidence, as any such evidence may well be
admissible in a trial on the murder indictment alone.
 In addition, we note that
Calzado's petition did not contain any argument that the
motion judge committed any "error that cannot be
remedied under the ordinary review process, " an
essential part of the showing under G. L. c. 211, § 3.
See, e.g., C.E. v. J.E., 472 Mass. 1016,
1016 (2015), quoting McGuinness v. Commonwealth, 420
Mass. 495, 497 (1995). This ...