L.R. & another.  
Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.
petitioner, G.G., obtained a civil harassment prevention
order in the Superior Court, pursuant to G. L. c. 258E,
against L.R. The order, and subsequent modifications of it,
contained various directives addressed to L.R., as well as to
L.R.'s employer, P.F. L.R.'s appeal presently is
pending in the Appeals Court; both the Superior Court judge
and a single justice of the Appeals Court denied L.R.'s
motion to stay enforcement of the order pending appeal.
L.R.'s appeal has been pending, a series of events ensued
in the Superior Court and the Appeals Court. Notably, a
second single justice of the Appeals Court modified a
provision of an order entered during the pendency of
L.R.'s appeal, denied L.R.'s motion to stay contempt
proceedings, and denied G.G.'s motion for sanctions. In
addition, after the Superior Court judge allowed G.G.'s
"motion to add" P.F. as a party to the proceedings
and entered other orders, P.F. appealed. That appeal also is
pending in the Appeals Court. On July 27, 2017, a third
single justice of the Appeals Court allowed P.F.'s motion
to stay enforcement of certain orders pending appeal and
L.R.'s motion to stay enforcement of a portion of an
order. The third single justice denied G.G.'s motions for
reconsideration of both orders, but treated them as notices
of appeal, and indicated that "the appeal shall proceed
in the normal course." Insofar as the record before us
indicates, G.G. has not pursued those appeals.
G.G. filed a petition in the county court, pursuant to G. L.
c. 211, § 3, primarily requesting that the court vacate
the Appeals Court single justice's July, 2017, orders. In
addition, the petition sought an order disqualifying a
particular attorney from representing L.R. or G.G., a
declaration that a certain constitutional provision is
unconstitutional as applied in the underlying proceedings,
and other relief. A single justice of this court
denied the petition without a hearing. G.G.'s appeal from
that particular ruling is what is now before us on a
memorandum and appendix filed pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21,
as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001). Rule 2:21 applies where a
single justice has denied relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211,
§ 3, from a challenged interlocutory ruling of the trial
court. Because relief properly may be denied under the
statute where adequate alternative remedies exist, the rule
requires the aggrieved party to "set forth the reasons
why review of the trial court decision cannot adequately be
obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the
trial court or by other available means." S.J.C. Rule
2:21 (2). "At this juncture, our focus is not on the
merits of any ruling . . ., but on the availability of other
remedies." Luke v. Commonwealth, 460 Mass.
1002, 1002 (2011) .
extent the petition sought relief from the orders of the
third single justice of the Appeals Court, the rule does not
apply because those orders are not interlocutory rulings
of the trial court. See Blonde v.
Antonelli, 463 Mass. 1002, 10(D2 (2012). It is
nonetheless evident on the record before us that the
petitioner has or had an adequate alternative remedy, namely,
an appeal from the Appeals Court single justice's orders
to a panel of that court. See Gifford v. Gifford,
451 Mass. 1012, 1013 (2008). If necessary, he could have
requested that the Appeals Court expedite such an appeal.
Single justices of this court are not obligated to exercise
the extraordinary power of general superintendence where a
petitioner does not attempt to pursue such adequate
alternative remedies. Blonde, supra at
extent the petition seeks relief from any interlocutory
ruling of the trial court, such as the denial of the
petitioner's request to disqualify defense counsel, the
petitioner failed to demonstrate why review of that ruling
cannot adequately be obtained through the ordinary appellate
process. See Farahini v. Hingham Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
445 Mass. 1024, 1024 (2006) (claim that counsel should be
disqualified may be raised on appeal from final judgment).
Similarly, while the petition sought certain declaratory
relief, the constitutional claims raised "could have
been addressed during the ordinary trial and appellate
process in the underlying case, " Longval v.
Superior Court Pep't of the Trial Court, 437 Mass.
1018, 1018-1019 (2002), or on appeal from the third Appeals
Court single justice's orders. Declaratory relief may not
be used as a substitute for an appeal. Id.
affirm that portion of the judgment that denies the petition
for relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3; with respect
to the request for declaratory relief, we remand to the
county court for entry of a judgment declaring that, because
of the available appellate remedy, the petitioner's
action does not state a controversy for purposes of G. L. c.
231A, and that an action for declaratory relief therefore
cannot be maintained.
case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by a
memorandum of law.
 Because the Appeals Court has used the
parties' initials in related proceedings, we do so as
 P.F. The Appeals Court also was named
as a party in G.G.'s petition in the county court. We
treat it as a nominal party. Cf. S.J.C. Rule 2:22, ...