Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.
Jurisdiction, Juvenile Court, Transfer hearing.
Practice, Criminal, Transfer hearing. Department
of Youth Services.
Elliot, pro se.
B. Linn, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
petitioner, Ronny Elliot, appeals from a judgment of a single
justice of this court denying his petition pursuant to G. L.
c. 211, § 3. We affirm.
1995, Elliot was indicted on charges of murder in the first
degree, armed assault with intent to murder, and possession
of a firearm without a license. He was seventeen years old at
the time. He was convicted by a Superior Court jury, in 1997,
of the lesser offense of murder in the second degree as well
as of the other offenses. This court affirmed the
convictions. See Commonwealth v. Elliot, 430 Mass.
498 (1999). Elliot subsequently filed a motion for a new
trial in 2000, and an amended motion for a new trial in 2003.
After a hearing, the amended motion was denied, in
Appeals Court affirmed the order denying the motion for a new
trial, and this court denied Elliot's application for
further appellate review. See Commonwealth v.
Elliot, 80 Mass.App.Ct. 1104 (memorandum and order
pursuant to rule 1:28), S.C., 460 Mass.
in 2015, Elliot filed his petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211,
§ 3, in the county court. In the petition, he argued
that because he had been "lawfully committed to the
Department of Youth Services" at the time of the murder,
he was entitled to a transfer hearing pursuant to G. L. c.
119, § 61, which was then in effect. Because no transfer
hearing was held, the Superior Court, in Elliot's view,
did not have jurisdiction to try him for murder. The single justice
denied the petition, noting that at the relevant time -- when
the murder occurred in 1995 -- a seventeen year old was an
adult in the eyes of the juvenile and criminal law. On that
basis, Elliot was not entitled to a transfer hearing.
appeal to this court, Elliot continues to press the argument
that he was entitled to a transfer hearing in the Juvenile
Court and that because he did not receive one, the Superior
Court lacked jurisdiction over his case. General Laws c. 119,
§ 61, provided at the time that
"[t]he [C]ommonwealth may request a transfer hearing
whenever it is alleged in a complaint that a child, who is
fourteen years old or older, has committed an offense against
a law of the [C]ommonwealth, which, if he were an adult,
would be punishable by imprisonment in the [S]tate prison,
and that the offense has allegedly been committed by a child
who had previously been committed to the [D]epartment of
G. L. c. 119, § 61, as amended through St. 1993, c. 12,
§ 3. In Elliot's view, because he was a child who
was fourteen or older and had been previously committed to
the Department of Youth Services (department), he was
entitled to a transfer hearing. The problem with this
argument is that the statute only applied in cases where the
Juvenile Court had jurisdiction in the first instance. (There
would be no need for a transfer hearing unless the case
originated in the Juvenile Court.) Because a seventeen year
old was not, at the time, considered a "child, "
the Juvenile Court did not have jurisdiction over the matter.
See, e.g., G. L. c. 119, § 52, as amended through St.
1992, c. 379, § 15 (defining the ages for
"delinquent child" as between seven and seventeen
and for "youthful offender" as between fourteen and
seventeen). See also R.L. Ireland & P. Kilcoyne, Juvenile
Law § 1.16 (2d ed. 2006 & Supp. 2018) (addressing
Juvenile Court jurisdiction and noting that in 2013, the
Legislature expanded the jurisdiction of that court over
delinquency and youthful offender cases by raising the age of
the offender from seventeen to eighteen). Furthermore, the
fact that Elliot had previously been committed to the
department was, in the circumstances, of no moment because
Elliot would not have been subject to the jurisdiction of the
Juvenile Court in any event.
single justice did not err or abuse her discretion in denying
relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.
 The amended motion for a new trial had
previously been bifurcated, and one part had been
"deemed withdrawn but not waived without