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Scatto-Bobilier v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds

Superior Court of Massachusetts, Plymouth

July 6, 2017

Janet Scatto-Bobilier [1]
v.
Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds

          Filed July 12, 2017

          MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON THE PARTIES' CROSS MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

          Robert C. Cosgrove, Justice

         Introduction

         Plaintiff Janet Scatto-Bobillier on the same day pled guilty to two separate complaints of operating under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, and was sentenced to concurrent first offender dispositions. Thereafter, the Registrar of Motor Vehicles imposed certain conditions, and Scatto-Bobillier exercised her right to appeal to the Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds. G.L.c. 90, § 28. The matter is now before this court on the plaintiff's administrative appeal from the Board's decision pursuant to G.L.c. 30A, § 14. Both sides have moved for judgment on the pleadings.

         Background

         A review of the administrative record reveals the following.

         On June 19, 2015, Scatto-Bobillier was arrested in Bridgewater and charged with operating a motor vehicle under the influence of liquor. (R. 1, 8.) On February 20, 2016, she was again arrested for OUI, this time in West Bridgewater. (R. 1, 8.) She was offered a chemical test of her breath or blood and refused. That refusal was reported to the Registrar of Motor Vehicles, who found that Scatto-Bobillier had no prior convictions or program assignments for OUI. The chemical test refusal driver's license suspension would be for 180 days, beginning February 20, 2016. (R. 5). On April 14, 2014, Scatto-Bobillier admitted to sufficient facts on both complaints. The court continued the cases without a finding for one year, imposed a 45-day loss of license, and ordered Scatto-Bobillier to complete an alcohol education program. See G.L.c. 90, § 24D. (R. 8; 16-17.)

         As recounted in the administrative record,

On September 15, 2016, Scatto-Bobillier appeared with counsel, before the Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds (Board) to appeal the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (Registrar) order imposing a 90-day OUIL license suspension and to require an ignition interlock device (IID), for two years from the date of installation, as required by G.L.c. 90, § 241/2. After the hearing, the Board modified the Registrar's order and reduced the 90-day OUIL license suspension to 45 days, as ordered by the Court. The Board affirmed the second OUIL license suspension but ran both 45-day license suspensions concurrently, starting August 18, 2016, the completion date of the chemical test refusal suspension. The Board affirmed the requirement that Scatto-Bobillier have an IID in her vehicle for two years after she fully reinstates. See G.L.c. 90, § 241/2.

(R. 1.)

         Scatto-Bobillier has appealed to this court, seeking relief from the requirement that she have an IID in her vehicle for two years after she fully reinstates.

         Discussion

          General Laws c. 30A, § 14, grants any person or entity aggrieved by a decision of any agency in an adjudicatory proceeding the right to appeal that decision to the Superior Court. Unless irregularities in the procedure before the agency are alleged, a court's review of an agency decision is confined to the administrative record. G.L.c. 30A, § 14(5). The party appealing an administrative decision pursuant to G.L.c. 30A, § 14, bears the burden of demonstrating its invalidity. Merisme v. Board of Appeals on Motor Vehicle Liab. Policies & Bonds, 27 Mass.App.Ct. 470, 474, 539 N.E.2d 1052 (1989).

          This court may reverse or modify the agency decision only " if it determines that the substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced" because the decision is " unsupported by substantial evidence, " or is " arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law." G.L.c. 30A, § 14(7). Here, Scatto-Bobillier argues that the ...


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