United States District Court, D. Massachusetts
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT (#30)
PAGE KELLEY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
September 9, 2016, plaintiff Amy Drachman filed the operative
first amended complaint (#20) against her former employer
Boston Scientific Corporation (BSC) and several of its
executive employees alleging violations of the Family Medical
Leave Act, the Massachusetts Wage Act, the Americans with
Disabilities Act, as well as common law claims for breach of
contract and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Defendants moved to dismiss portions of the first amended
complaint. (#21.) This court issued a Report and
Recommendation in which it recommended allowing
defendants' motion in part and denying it in part (#28),
which recommendation was adopted in full by the district
judge to whom this case is assigned, O'Toole, J.
before the court is Drachman's motion for leave to file a
second amended complaint (##30, 31). Plaintiff seeks to amend the
complaint by adding a claim against BSC for violation of the
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.,
along with facts in support. See (#30); see
also (#35-1, revised proposed second amended complaint.)
Defendants responded in opposition (##32, 40). At
this juncture the motion stands ready for decision.
familiarity with the facts of this case is
presumed. The court will set forth abbreviated facts
as alleged in the revised proposed second amended complaint
in order to set the stage.
a medical device manufacturer and Drachman's former
employer. (#35-1 ¶¶ 5, 7.) Plaintiff began working
for BSC on September 1, 2010 as BSC's Director of
Employment Policy and Compliance. Id. ¶¶
5, 11. Drachman has a medical condition that, in 2013,
resulted in her taking a leave of absence from work and
limited her to working in a part-time capacity after that.
Id. ¶¶ 12-21. Drachman alleges that BSC
failed to make appropriate accommodations for her and
ultimately terminated her because of her disability. See
Standard of Review.
15, Fed. R. Civ. P., provides in relevant part that
“[t]he court should freely give leave [to amend] when
justice so requires.” The inquiry here is whether
Drachman's proposed amendments would be
futile. See Hatch v. Dep't for Children,
Youth & Their Families, 274 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir.
2001) (“futility is fully sufficient to justify the
denial of a motion to amend”); Correa-Martinez v.
Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 59 (1st Cir. 1990)
(“Where an amendment would be futile or would serve no
legitimate purpose, the district court should not needlessly
prolong matters.”). The First Circuit has explained
that the court's leave to amend analysis is context
specific. See Nikitine v. Wilmington Trust Co., 715
F.3d 388, 390 (1st Cir. 2013) (addressing a district
court's decision to deny a motion for leave to amend, the
court noted that “[e]verything depends on
If leave to amend is sought before discovery is complete and
neither party has moved for summary judgment, the accuracy of
the ‘futility' label is gauged by reference to the
liberal criteria of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
See Glassman v. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617,
623 (1st Cir. 1996). In this situation, amendment is not
deemed futile as long as the proposed amended complaint sets
forth a general scenario which, if proven, would entitle the
plaintiff to relief against the defendant on some cognizable
Hatch, 274 F.3d at 19; Juarez v. Select
Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 708 F.3d 269, 276 (1st Cir.
the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, the court must
“‘accept as true all well-pleaded facts set forth
in the [proposed] complaint and draw all reasonable
inferences therefrom in the pleader's favor.'”
Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir.
2011) (quoting Artuso v.Vertex Pharm., Inc., 637
F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2011)). When considering the viability of
a proposed amendment, the court “may augment these
facts and inferences with data points gleaned from documents
incorporated by reference [. . .], matters of public record,
and facts susceptible to judicial notice.”
Haley, 657 F.3d at 46 (citing In re Colonial
Mortg. Bankers Corp., 324 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 2003)).
order to pass muster under Rule 12(b)(6), Drachman must
provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” See Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The “obligation
to provide the grounds of [plaintiff's] entitlement to
relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” Id. at 555 (internal quotation
marks and alteration omitted). The “[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level, ” and to cross the “line
from conceivable to plausible.” Id. at 555,
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). However,
the court is “‘not bound to accept as true a
legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'”
Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555). Simply put, the court ...