United States District Court, D. Massachusetts
OPINION AND ORDER
A. O'Toole, Jr., United States District Judge
plaintiff, Precious Okereke, proceeding pro se,
brought suit in state court against several individuals
affiliated with the Boston Public Library. The defendants
removed the suit to this Court and moved to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a claim.
plaintiff alleges that, after being accused of inappropriate
behavior at a branch of the Boston Public Library, a trespass
notice was issued against her and her library usage
privileges were suspended for a period of approximately six
months. She contends that her library privileges were
suspended without the opportunity for “pre- and post-
deprivation hearings.” (Notice of Removal, Ex. 1 at 4
(dkt. no. 1-1).)
the plaintiff perfunctorily references a variety of causes of
action, her complaint, construed broadly, generally sounds in
procedural due process. The due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State may
“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend XIV,
§ 1. In in order state a procedural due process claim, a
plaintiff “must identify a protected liberty or
property interest and allege that the defendants, acting
under color of state law, deprived [him] of that interest
without constitutionally adequate process.”
González-Colón, 660 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir.
2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Aponte-Torres v.
Univ. of P.R., 445 F.3d 50, 56 (1st Cir. 2006)).
“[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation
demands.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
334 (1976) (alteration in original) (quoting Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)); accord
González-Droz, 660 F.3d at 13.
assuming the suspension of library privileges implicates a
cognizable liberty or property interest, see, e.g.,
Wayfield v. Town of Tisbury, 925 F.Supp. 880, 885
(D. Mass. 1996), the plaintiff has failed to identify a
constitutionally inadequate process attendant to the
suspension. She appears to contend, without development, that
her privileges were suspended without a hearing. However, a
pre-deprivation hearing, in the formal sense of the word, is
not necessarily required, see, e.g., Nappi v.
Timberline Reg'l Library, No. C14-5945 JRC, 2015 WL
3936308, at *3 (W.D. Wash. June 26, 2015), and the plaintiff
has not provided sufficient details as to what process
occurred or did not occur before the suspension. For example,
she “does not allege that [her] privileges were
suspended on the basis of false accusations that [s]he did
not have the opportunity to refute, that [s]he was banned on
the basis of an invalid or vague policy, that [s]he was
banned without warning or that [s]he has been denied an
opportunity to seek readmittance to the library.”
Moore v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., No.
11-cv-304-bbc, 2011 WL 1897772, at *2 (W.D. Wis. May 18,
2011). Not only is it ambiguous as to whether she had any
notice or opportunity to be heard prior to the suspension
(short of a formal “hearing”), but it is also
unclear what purpose a pre-deprivation hearing would have
served. See id.; see also
González-Droz, 660 F.3d at 13-14. Further, the
plaintiff's attack on the adequacy of the
post-deprivation process can be summarily rejected as it
appears she was afforded the opportunity to appeal the
suspension. She does not allege that she took
advantage of the opportunity to appeal her decision, and
instead appears to have chosen to file suit directly instead.
foregoing reasons, the defendants' Motion to Dismiss
(dkt. no 4) is GRANTED. The complaint is
 To the extent the plaintiff seeks to
advance the other claims summarily referenced in her
“bases of complaint, ” the mere reference to the
various causes of action without any factual support is
insufficient to state a claim, as the defendant correctly
 The plaintiff was informed that she
could appeal her suspension in the same letter that notified
her about the trespass notice and library suspension.
Although the defendants attached the letter to their motion
to dismiss, it is fairly incorporated into the complaint.
See Rodi v. S. N.E. Sch. Of Law, 389 F.3d 5, 12 (1st
Cir. 2004) (citations omitted); accord Beddall v. State
Street Bank & Trust Co., 137 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir.
1998) (“When, as now, a complaint's factual
allegations are expressly linked to-and admittedly dependent
upon-a document (the authenticity of which is not
challenged), that document effectively merges into the
pleadings and the trial court can review it in deciding a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” (citations
 The plaintiff has been enjoined from
“filing any additional or new claims, cases,
complaints, or other documents in this Court, in any manner,
way or form, without first obtaining the written approval of
a judge of this Court.” Okereke v. Bos. Police
Hackney Div., C.A. No. 11-11626-RWZ, at *5 (D. Mass.
Sept. 19, 2012). The prohibition does not preclude the
plaintiff “from exercising any appeal ...