JOANNE M. POPP
ROBERT L. POPP.
and Separation, Alimony, Modification of judgment.
Judgment affirmed. Richard M. Novitch (Elaine M. Epstein also
present) for the wife.
Patricia A. DeJuneas for the husband.
M. Popp argues that the application of the durational limits
of the Alimony Reform Act of 2011 (act), St. 2011, c. 124, to
the alimony agreement between her and her former husband,
Robert L. Popp, is unconstitutionally retroactive. For
reasons set forth in our decision issued today in Van
Arsdale v. Van Arsdale, 477 Mass. (2017), we conclude
that the act's durational limits are constitutional. We
address here Joanne's claim that the Probate and Family
Court judge abused her discretion in declining to award
Joanne alimony beyond the act's durational limits.
and Robert were married in 1988 and divorced in 1994. They
remarried in 1996 and divorced again in 2011. The
parties' separation agreement provided for Robert to pay
Joanne $12, 000 per month in alimony. The relevant alimony
provisions of the agreement merged with the divorce judgment.
2014, Robert sought to modify his alimony obligation,
claiming a material change of circumstances, G. L. c. 208,
§ 49 (e), because his income had decreased by
fifty-five per cent. The judge agreed with Robert that his
decreased income was a material change of circumstances
warranting modification, and reduced the monthly alimony
payments to $8, 575. The judge also applied the act's
durational limits, G. L. c. 208, § 49, to the agreement,
and ordered that based on the length of the parties'
second marriage, Robert's alimony obligation would
terminate in August, 2020.
from the constitutional claim, see Van Arsdale,
supra at, Joanne claims that the judge abused her
discretion by ordering alimony to terminate in 2020, the
presumptive termination date provided for in the
See Holmes v. Holmes, 467 Mass. 653, 661 (2014)
(alimony modification judgments reviewed for abuse of
discretion). Specifically, Joanne claims that the judge did
not consider two of the factors set forth in G. L. c. 208,
§ 53 (a.), (ability to maintain marital lifestyle and
lost economic opportunity as a result of the marriage) that
the judge is obligated to consider. See Duff-Kareores v.
Kareores, 474 Mass. 528, 535-536 (2016) . After
examining the judge's detailed written findings, we are
satisfied that all of the relevant factors were considered.
In regard to the two allegedly missing factors, the judge
made detailed findings about Joanne's employment and
earnings history throughout the parties' relationship, as
well as Joanne's current financial situation; these
findings support the result she reached. In sum, the judge
did not abuse her discretion in concluding that Joanne failed
to prove that deviation beyond the act's durational
limits was required in the interests of justice at the time
of the hearing on the complaint for modification.,  G. L. c.
208, § 49 (b). See George v. George, 476 Mass.
65, 70 (2016) .
 Joanne Popp also appears to argue that
the judge erred by not including the length of the
parties' first marriage in her calculation of the length
of the marriage for purposes of determining the presumptive
termination date of alimony under the Alimony Reform Act of
2011 (act), G. L. c. 208, § 49 (b). She makes this
argument in one footnote and in passing references in the
text without citation to legal authority. This argument is
therefore waived. Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (4), as amended, 367
Mass. 921 (1975).
 Prior to the presumptive termination
of alimony in 2020, Joanne is free to file a motion arguing
that deviation beyond the durational limits is required in
the interests of justice, G. L. c. 208, § 49 (b). If she
chooses to do so, the circumstances of the parties should be
examined as they exist at the time ...