United States District Court, D. Massachusetts
OPINION AND ORDER
A. O'Toole, Jr. United States District Judge.
plaintiff, Willie Wallace, acting pro se, has
brought a number of claims against various correctional
officers and nurses at the Essex County Correctional Facility
(“ECCF”). His claims stem from what the plaintiff
alleges was inadequate treatment of his toothache in October
facts presented in the operative pleadings are relatively
sparse, but the following is fairly alleged: The plaintiff
was admitted to ECCF on September 25, 2014, as a pretrial
detainee and complained of a painful toothache. The plaintiff
submitted a number of sick call slips to a nurse and was
given Motrin for the pain. On October 6,  the plaintiff
filed additional sick call slips and two medical grievances,
to which Amy Gordon, the chief administrator of the
contracted healthcare provider, responded.
October 6, the plaintiff, experiencing excruciating pain,
spoke to Sergeant Greg Turner, who arranged for the plaintiff
to talk to a nurse who was dispensing medicine in the
medicine line. That nurse also gave the plaintiff Motrin. The
plaintiff alleges that, at the time, there was “visible
swelling” on his face. (Am. Compl. ¶ 24 (dkt. no.
8).) Turner denied the plaintiff's further request to go
to the infirmary.
hours later, the plaintiff again approached Turner and
collapsed on the ground from the pain. Turner allegedly
kicked the plaintiff in an attempt to get him to rise and
allowed 50 to 60 inmates to step over him. Turner and
Sergeant Lane picked the plaintiff up and brought him to the
infirmary. There, Nurse Janice Hall told the officers that
“there was no severity in [the p]laintiff's medical
situation, ” despite the plaintiff's “swollen
face and cries of pain.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 31.)
plaintiff alleges that for this incident, Turner wrote a
disciplinary report for faking a medical injury and Lane
found him guilty without reviewing evidence.
that day, the plaintiff alleges, Lieutenant Heath Carafa
entered the plaintiff's room, insulted him, called him a
racial slur, wrote “a false disciplinary report”
after ordering the plaintiff to get off his bunk, and
escorted the plaintiff to the segregation unit. (Am. Compl.
¶¶ 36-39.) During this time, the plaintiff was in
severe pain and could not move or speak. The plaintiff
alleges that Lieutenant David Fortune did not afford the
plaintiff an adequate disciplinary hearing with respect to
Carafa's report. The plaintiff appealed both disciplinary
reports to Superintendent Michael Marks, who denied the
the night in the segregation unit, the two unnamed
segregation officers refused to provide the plaintiff medical
attention or give him a grievance form.
morning on the next day, an officer saw an abnormally large
bump on the plaintiff's face and rushed him to the
infirmary. The plaintiff was then transferred to a hospital,
where he apparently received treatment for his condition.
various named ECCF employee defendants have moved to dismiss
the claims against them. The plaintiff has not filed a formal
opposition to the motion. Hall, a member of the nursing
staff, has separately moved to dismiss the claims against
her. The plaintiff has opposed that motion.
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual allegations to state a claim that is
“plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A complaint
“stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility” where it “pleads facts that are
‘merely consistent with' a defendant's
liability.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). The
factual content of the complaint must allow a court “to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
Cousins and Marks, no relevant acts or omissions are alleged.
To make out a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a
plaintiff must prove that the defendant in question
personally participated in the complained of actions or
inaction. See Vélez-Rivera v. Agosto-Alicea,
437 F.3d 145, 156 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Cepero-Rivera
v. Fagundo, 414 F.3d 124, 129 (1st Cir. 2005)). Merely
alleging that a defendant served in a supervisory role is by
itself insufficient. See id. (“A plaintiff
must show an affirmative link between the subordinate officer
and the supervisor, whether through direct participation or
through conduct that amounts to condonation or tacit
authorization.” (citation omitted)). Other than
Marks's denial of the plaintiff's appeals (for which
the pleadings provide no ...