FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
MASSACHUSETTS [Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge]
Aidlin for appellant.
Begg Lawrence, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
Carmen M. Ortiz, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
Howard, Chief Judge, Torruella and Barron, Circuit Judges.
BARRON, Circuit Judge.
Jonathan Fey was convicted for his failure to register as a
sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act ("SORNA"), 18 U.S.C. §
2250(a). He now challenges a number of the special conditions
of supervised release that the District Court imposed in
connection with the sentence for that conviction. For the
reasons set forth below, we vacate the condition restricting
Fey's contact with children but affirm the remaining
conditions that he challenges.
obligation to register pursuant to SORNA stems from an
incident that took place in 1999. In August of that year, Fey
-- then 29 years old -- rented a motel room to host a party
with his co-workers, one of whom was V.P., a 16-year-old
girl. Fey provided V.P. with alcohol and then raped her after
she passed out. As a result of that incident, Fey was
convicted in Massachusetts state court of (1) rape and (2)
indecent assault and battery on a person over 14 years of
age. Fey served nine years in prison and was released on June
his release from prison, Fey registered as a sex offender on
five separate occasions. After June 22, 2011, however, he
failed to continue to update his registration. In July 2011,
a warrant was issued for his arrest based on Fey's
failure to register. Fey was eventually located and arrested
in Ohio in May 2014. At the time of his arrest, Fey was
living with his fiancée and her four minor daughters.
pleaded guilty to the SORNA violation on October 28, 2014, in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. At
his sentencing, the District Court imposed a period of
imprisonment of eighteen months, a five-year period of
supervised release, and a number of conditions of supervised
release, three of which Fey now challenges on appeal.
assess the validity of a special condition of supervised
release by applying 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and
§5D1.3(b) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.
United States v. Pabon, 819 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir.
2016). Those provisions "require that special conditions
cause no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably
necessary to achieve the goals of supervised release, and
that the conditions be reasonably related both to these goals
and to the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant."
Id. (quoting United States v. Del
Valle-Cruz, 785 F.3d 48, 58 (1st Cir. 2015)).
imposing a special condition, "the district court is
'required to provide a reasoned and case-specific
explanation for the conditions it imposes.'"
Id. (quoting Del Valle-Cruz, 785 F.3d at
58). Such an explanation both is required by statute,
see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), and facilitates our
review on appeal, Pabon, 819 F.3d at 31. If the
sentencing court does not explicitly provide such an
explanation, however, we will not automatically vacate the
condition. Id. Instead, we will attempt to
"infer the court's reasoning from the record."
Id. "In all cases, however, the sentence must
find 'adequate evidentiary support in the
record.'" Id. (quoting Del
Valle-Cruz, 785 F.3d at 58).
first challenges a condition restricting his right to