August 26, 2016
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND AMENDED JUDGMENT
J. Curran, Associate Justice.
case comes before the court from an unusual trajectory. Mr.
Snell, a state prisoner, filed an Application for a Temporary
Restraining Order seeking to enjoin certain then-pending
state prison disciplinary proceedings directly with the
Supreme Judicial Court which, after about a month,
transferred to the matter to the Middlesex Superior
Snell's complaint asserts 18 causes of action, virtually
all of which revolve around his disagreement with two prison
disciplinary reports issued against him by the Department of
Correction. All defendants have moved to dismiss Mr.
Snell's complaint. A hearing was held and after reviewing
the moving and opposition papers, the motion must be ALLOWED.
survive a motion to dismiss under Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a
complaint must set forth the grounds of the plaintiff's
entitlement to relief with more than mere " labels and
conclusions." Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co.,
451 Mass. 623, 636, 888 N.E.2d 879 (2008), citing Bell A.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167
L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The factual allegations in the complaint
need not be detailed, however, they " must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . .
[based] on the assumption that all the allegations in the
complaint are true . . ." Id. At this pleading
stage, Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) requires factual "
'allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent
with)' an entitlement to relief" to show that the
complaint " possesses enough heft to 'sho[w] that
the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id.,
quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
considering this motion, the Court may consider public
documents and records such as other court filings and docket
sheets. See Home Depot, Inc. v. Kardas, 81
Mass.App.Ct. 27, 28, 958 N.E.2d 531 (2011). See also
Mmoe v. Commonwealth, 393 Mass. 617, 620, 473 N.E.2d
address each of Mr. Snell's counts, in logical, but not
necessarily numerical, order.
Mr. Snell's Disciplinary Proceedings . Counts
II, III, V, VI, VII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVII and
XVIII relate to the disciplinary reports about which Mr.
Snell must exhaust his administrative remedies before
bringing a lawsuit. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81,
126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006). See also
G.L.c. 127, section 38F. He has failed to do so.
state regulations governing prison operations, an inmate
wishing to appeal a matter relating to disciplinary
proceeding must do so by filing an appeal with the
Superintendent within 15 days after receiving the decision on
the disciplinary matter. 103 Code of Massachusetts Regulation
430.18(1). This did not happen. Accordingly, Mr.
Snell's appeals are time-barred and he has waived his
right to relief by failing to exhaust his administrative
remedies. Stokes v. Commonwealth, 26 Mass.App.Ct.
585, 590, 530 N.E.2d 801 (1988). These counts must be
our inquiry does not end there: there are many more of Mr.
Snell's counts to be addressed.
Mr. Snell's Constitutional Claims . Count III,
V, X, XI, XIV and XV claim that Mr. Snell's
constitutional rights were violated; count VII claims that
Mr. Snell received a sanction that was " excessive"
under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution;
and count ...