United States District Court, D. Massachusetts
LISA J. GILLARD, Plaintiff,
THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS Defendant.
J. Casper United States District Judge.
before the Court is Plaintiff Lisa J. Gillard’s Motion
for Relief from Judgment or Order Pursuant to Rule 60(b). For
the reasons stated below, the motion is denied and plaintiff
is warned of the Court’s authority to sanction
Lisa J. Gillard (“Gillard”) commenced this action
on April 18, 2016, by filing a complaint against the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.
See D. 1. With her complaint, she filed an
application to proceed in district court without prepaying
fees or costs and a supporting affidavit. See D. 2.
In her complaint, Gillard challenged rulings made by Judge
Sorokin in Gillard v. The President and Fellows at
Harvard College, Civil Action No. 15-10052, and
Gillard v. The President and Fellows at Harvard
College, Civil Action No. 15-13944.
Memorandum and Order dated April 27, 2016, this action was
dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction.
See D. 5. Gillard subsequently filed an amended
complaint, a motion for relief from judgment or order, an
amended motion for relief from judgment or order, a motion to
strike, a motion to consolidate cases and four memoranda of
law. See D. 7 - 11, 13 - 16. Gillard’s motions
were denied by Orders dated June 8, 2016. See D. 19
before the Court is Gillard’s Motion for Relief from
Judgment or Order Pursuant to Rule 60(b). See D. 20.
Gillard seeks relief from judgment in this action, as well as
Gillard v. The President and Fellows at Harvard
College, Civil Action No. 15-10052-LTS and Gillard
v. The President and Fellows at Harvard College, Civil
Action No. 15-13944-LTS. Gillard references the
“so-called ‘Bursting Bubble’ theory”
in support of her request to reopen and consolidate these
three actions. Id. She contends that the Court has
denied her “individual rights to redress grievances
under the First, Fifth and Eighth Amendment under the Bill of
Rights, notwithstanding the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution and the Declaration of Independence as an
indigent minority.” Id. Gillard complains that
her motions have been “continually” denied and
that such actions “by the Court are considered
‘cruel’ and ‘unusual’ punishment by
a motion for relief from judgment or order pursuant to Rule
60(b), see D. 20, fails to state any legitimate
basis to have this Court reconsider its prior orders. The
Court finds Gillard’s arguments unpersuasive as they
reiterate some of the arguments that the Court previously
considered and rejected. Gillard’s post-judgment
motions suggest an unwillingness to accept the disposition of
this action or to accept the finality of rulings in other
actions as well as she seeks to have this Court reopen the
closed 2015 actions. See D. 20.
2010, Gillard pursued a second discrimination lawsuit against
the Southern New England School of Law despite the fact that
her first lawsuit, Gillard v. Southern New England
School of Law, No. 05-10244-RCL, was dismissed on
the merits when the district court entered summary judgment
for the defendant on all of her claims. See Gillard v.
Southern New England School of Law, No. 10-10427-RGS
(Jul 23, 2010 dismissed as barred by res judicata),
aff’d No. 10-2143 (1st Cir. Feb. 7, 2011),
cert. denied, 563 U.S. 1030 (2011) (the Clerk of the
United States Supreme Court was directed not to accept any
further petitions in noncriminal matters from Gillard due to
her repeated abuse of that Court’s process).
Gillard’s motion for reconsideration of order denying
leave to proceed in forma pauperis was denied.
Gillard v. Southern New England School of Law, ___
U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 83 (Oct. 3, 2011).
plaintiff’s litigious history, this Court now finds
that plaintiff’s post-judgment motions are without
merit and her conduct is vexatious and an abuse of the
processes of this Court for the administration of
justice. The Court recognizes that when Gillard was
directed to stop contacting court employees by email,
see D. 12, she appears to have followed the
Court’s instructions. See Docket.
district court has the power to enjoin litigants who abuse
the court system by filing groundless and vexatious
litigation. Elbery v. Louison, 201 F.3d 427, 1999 WL
1295871 at *2 (1st Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (citing Cok v.
Family Court of Rhode Island, 985 F.2d 32, 34 (1st Cir.
1993)). Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, the Court may impose sanctions
on an unrepresented party if she submits a pleading for an
improper purpose or if the claims within it are frivolous or
malicious. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b)(1), (2); Eagle
Eye Fishing Corp. v. Department of Commerce, 20 F.3d
503, 506 (1st Cir. 1994) (pro se parties, like all
parties and counsel are required to comply with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure); Pronav Charter II, Inc. v.
Nolan, 206 F.Supp.2d 46, 53 (D. Mass. 2002) (Rule 11
applies to pro se litigants) (citation omitted).
Rule 11 exists, in part, to protect defendants and the Court
from wasteful, frivolous and harassing lawsuits and provides
for sanctions as a deterrent. See Navarro-Ayala v.
Nunez, 968 F.2d 1421, 1426 (1st Cir. 1992). In addition
to Rule 11, section 1927 of Title 28 provides for the
imposition of costs and expenses, including attorneys’
fees, against a person for unreasonable and vexatious
litigation. 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
from authority under Rule 11 and § 1927, a district
court has the inherent power to manage its own proceedings
and to control the conduct of litigants who appear before it
through orders or the issuance of monetary sanctions for
bad-faith, vexatious, wanton or oppressive behavior. See
Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46-50 (1991);
accord United States v. Kouri-Perez, 187 F.3d 1, 6-8
(1st Cir. 1999) (same).
on the foregoing, it is ...