United States District Court, D. Massachusetts
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
Dennis Saylor IV United States District Judge
a claim for overtime wages under the Massachusetts Wage Act
brought by plaintiff Marc Scarpaci against his former
employer, Lowe’s Home Center, LLC. Scarpaci contends
that he is entitled to compensation under the statute for
hours worked in excess of forty hours per week. The complaint
also brings claims for recovery under theories of conversion,
breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and quantum
has moved for summary judgment as to all claims. For the
reasons described below, the motion will be granted.
following facts are either undisputed or presented in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Lowe’s Home Center, LLC is a home improvement retailer
that operates several store locations in Massachusetts.
Plaintiff Marc Scarpaci first began working at Lowe’s
in June 2002, when he was hired as a
“receiver/stocker.” (Def. App’x. 10).
Eventually, Scarpaci was promoted to the position of
operations manager of the Lowe’s store in Haverhill,
Massachusetts, which he held until February 2010.
was then transferred to a Lowe’s store in Saugas,
Massachusetts, where he continued to serve as operations
manager. In February 2011, his position as operations manager
was eliminated, and he assumed the newly-created position of
assistant store manager. (Id. at 125).
receiver/stocker, Scarpaci was paid a rate of $12 per hour.
(Id. at 10-11). Once he was promoted to operations
manager and then assistant store manager, Lowe’s
classified him as an “exempt” employee. (Howland
Aff. ¶ 18). Lowe’s payroll records show that after
his promotion to operations manager, he was paid a
consistent, fixed amount. (Def. App’x. 64-72). Those
records also credit Scarpaci with 40 hours worked every week,
although he contends that he frequently worked more than
amount. (Id.). He did not receive any overtime pay
while he was employed as a manager. (Howland Aff. ¶ 20).
contends that Scarpaci was paid an annual salary of $50, 000
when he was first promoted to operations manager; a salary
between $74, 303 and $78, 248 from December 2008 until
February 2011; and a salary of $69, 474 from February 2011
until November 15, 2011. (Id. ¶ 7; Def.
App’x. 10-11). He also received management bonuses; those
bonuses were paid based upon the overall performance of the
store (as compared to the store’s sales goals) and were
not dependent on the number of hours he worked. (Id.
at 7; Howland Aff. ¶¶ 51-53).
his employment at Lowe’s, Scarpaci’s paycheck was
directly deposited into his bank account. (Def. App’x.
131). He downloaded his pay stubs from “Lowe’s
Net.” (Scarpaci Dep. 62-63). Each pay stub that he
received as an operations manager or assistant store manager
reflected “80 hours” for each bi-weekly pay
period, even though he regularly worked more than that
amount. (Def. App’x. 123).
November 2011, Lowe’s informed Scarpaci that he would
be transferred to a different location. (Howland Aff. ¶
10). On Tuesday, November 15, 2011, he went on unpaid
personal leave. His final paycheck was issued on that Friday,
November 18, 2011. He did not perform any work for the
company after November 15. (Id. ¶¶ 11-13).
Lowe’s formally terminated his employment on November
14, 2012, one year after his personal leave began.
(Id. ¶ 14).
October 21, 2013, Scarpaci filed a claim against Lowe’s
with the Massachusetts Attorney General for alleged
violations of the Massachusetts Wage Act. (Compl. Exs. C, D).
On November 8, 2013, the Attorney General’s Office gave
notice that it declined to pursue the claim and authorized
him to bring his own action. (Compl. Ex. E). Scarpaci filed
the complaint in this action on December 31, 2014.
complaint alleges claims for (1) violation of the
Massachusetts Wage Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 150;
(2) conversion; (3) breach of contract; (4) unjust
enrichment; (5) quantum meruit; and (6) constructive
trust. Lowe’s has moved for summary judgment on all
role of summary judgment is to “pierce the pleadings
and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a
genuine need for trial.” Mesnick v. General Elec.
Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir. 1991) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate
when the moving party shows that “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
“Essentially, Rule 56 mandates the entry of summary
judgment ‘against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential
to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear
the burden of proof at trial.’” Coll v. PB
Diagnostic Sys., 50 F.3d 1115, 1121 (1st Cir. 1995)
(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986)). In making that determination, the court must view
“the record in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant, drawing reasonable inferences in his favor.”
Noonan v. Staples, Inc., 556 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir.
2009). When “a properly supported motion for summary
judgment is made, the adverse party ‘must set forth