Donald R. Landry
Massachusetts Port Authority & another. 
November 12, 2015.
action commenced in the Superior Court Department on June 25,
case was heard by C. Jeffrey Kinder, J., on motions
for summary judgment.
E. Lynch for the defendants.
M. De Maio for the plaintiff.
Cohen, Grainger, & Wolohojian, JJ.
plaintiff, Donald R. Landry, brought this negligence action
pursuant to the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, G. L. c. 258,
seeking damages from the defendants, the Massachusetts Port
Authority (Massport) and the city of Worcester (city), for
injuries he sustained at the Worcester Regional Airport
(airport) when a motorized sliding gate pinned him to a metal
protruding from the gate post. The defendants jointly moved
for summary judgment, claiming that Landry was injured by
reason of a defect in a way and, hence, his exclusive remedy
was an action under G. L. c. 84, § § 15, 18, and
19. See Botello v. Massachusetts Port
Authy., 47 Mass.App.Ct. 788, 789, 716 N.E.2d 664 &
n.3 (1999). Because it was undisputed that Landry had not
given notice within thirty days of his injury, as required by
c. 84, § 18, the defendants argued that they were
entitled to judgment as matter of law. The city also argued
that it was entitled to summary judgment for the independent
reason that it was not responsible for " the way at
of the Superior Court denied summary judgment, concluding
that the defendants had failed to establish that the site of
the accident was a " way,"  and that there
remained a genuine issue of material fact as to the
city's responsibility for the maintenance and operation
of the gate. The defendants then jointly filed a notice of
appeal from this interlocutory order, claiming entitlement to
immediate review under the doctrine of present execution.
Although we conclude that the appeal is not properly before
us and must be dismissed, we exercise our discretion to
consider the defendants' substantive arguments, which we
find to be without merit.
Viewing the evidence in the summary judgment record in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, see Augat,
Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120, 571
N.E.2d 357 (1991), the relevant facts may be summarized as
follows. On June 26, 2009, Landry, an employee of a
commercial laundry, drove to the airport to make a delivery
of clean uniforms to the airport maintenance department. At
that time, under the terms of an ...