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Haddad v. Baker

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts

October 6, 2015

PHILIP G. HADDAD, JR., Plaintiff,
v.
CHARLES D. BAKER, JR. et. al., Defendants

         Filed October 5, 2015

          Philip G. Haddad Jr., Plaintiff, Pro se, Worcester, MA.

         For Charles D. Baker., Jr, Governor, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Timothy P. Alben, Superintendent, Mass. State Police, James Jones, Major, Mass. State Police, Sean Newman, Trooper, Mass. State Police, Mark R. Kmetz, Director, Mass. Div. of Professional Licensure, Christopher N. Carroll, Chief Investigator, Mass. Div. of Professional Licensure, Defendants: Joshua D. Jacobson, LEAD ATTORNEY, Office of the Attorney General Martha Coakley, One Ashburton Place, Boston, MA.

         For Peter C. Nordblom, President, Nordblom Company, Defendant: Robert R. Pierce, LEAD ATTORNEY, Pierce & Mandell, P.C, Boston, MA; Curtis B. Dooling, II, Pierce & Mandell, PC, Boston, MA.

         For Santiago Galaz, President, Securitas USA, Thomas R. Fagan, N.E. Reg. V.P., Securitas USA, Martine Florestal, Liaison, Securitas Security Sevices, Inc., Defendants: David R. Kerrigan, LEAD ATTORNEY, Kenney & Sams, P.C., Southborough, MA.

         ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS TO DISMISS

         Leo T. Sorokin, United States District Judge.

         Plaintiff Philip G. Haddad filed a pro se Complaint, which the Court interprets as alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. No. 1. Haddad brings these claims against private actors and state officials, and seeks $2.9 million in damages. The various Defendants named in the Complaint have filed three motions to dismiss. Doc. No. 21, 27, 35.

         I. BACKGROUND

         The facts are drawn from the Complaint. On April 12, 2012, Haddad went to a privately-owned building at 1000 Washington Street in Boston, Massachusetts, to visit the office of the Massachusetts Division of Insurance. Doc. No. 1 at ¶ ¶ 13, 23. His purpose in visiting the building was to " inquire as to the status of the content in correspondence previously forwarded to the Division of Insurance." Id. at ¶ 23.

         After clearing building security, Haddad proceeded to the eleventh floor to await the opening of the Division of Insurance. Id. at ¶ 13. Shortly thereafter, Defendant Martine Florestal of Securitas Security Services, Inc. (" Securitas" ), informed Haddad that he had to leave the building due to an outstanding Complaint and Order against him that was issued by the Massachusetts Division of Professional Licensure. Id. at ¶ 14. Haddad disputed the existence of such an Order and declined to leave, politely. Id. at ¶ 15. Florestal advised Haddad that she would contact the Massachusetts State Police if he did not leave the premises. Id.

         Soon thereafter, Defendant Massachusetts State Trooper Sean Newman appeared and advised Haddad that he must leave the building or face arrest. Id. at ¶ 16-17. Haddad agreed to leave, and Newman escorted him out of the building. Id. at ¶ 18. While doing so, seven Boston Police Officer approached Haddad, hands on their holstered weapons, and one officer stated that they were responding to a 911 call that reported " Haddad was in the building, was a threat to the lives of employees in the building, [and] was known to carry a weapon." Id. at ¶ 19. The authorities continued to escort Haddad from the building and a Boston Police Officer conducted a frisk search of Haddad with Haddad's consent, but found no weapon. Id. at ¶ 22. No excess force is alleged.

         II. LEGAL STANDARD

         " To survive a motion to dismiss [under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell A. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). " The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). For purposes of the Defendants' motions to dismiss, the Court " must take the allegations in the complaint as true and must make all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993).

         III. ...


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