United States District Court, D. Massachusetts
PHILIP G. HADDAD, JR., Plaintiff,
CHARLES D. BAKER, JR. et. al., Defendants
October 5, 2015
G. Haddad Jr., Plaintiff, Pro se, Worcester, MA.
Charles D. Baker., Jr, Governor, Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, Timothy P. Alben, Superintendent, Mass. State
Police, James Jones, Major, Mass. State Police, Sean Newman,
Trooper, Mass. State Police, Mark R. Kmetz, Director, Mass.
Div. of Professional Licensure, Christopher N. Carroll, Chief
Investigator, Mass. Div. of Professional Licensure,
Defendants: Joshua D. Jacobson, LEAD ATTORNEY, Office of the
Attorney General Martha Coakley, One Ashburton Place, Boston,
Peter C. Nordblom, President, Nordblom Company, Defendant:
Robert R. Pierce, LEAD ATTORNEY, Pierce & Mandell, P.C,
Boston, MA; Curtis B. Dooling, II, Pierce & Mandell, PC,
Santiago Galaz, President, Securitas USA, Thomas R. Fagan,
N.E. Reg. V.P., Securitas USA, Martine Florestal, Liaison,
Securitas Security Sevices, Inc., Defendants: David R.
Kerrigan, LEAD ATTORNEY, Kenney & Sams, P.C., Southborough,
ON PENDING MOTIONS TO DISMISS
Sorokin, United States District Judge.
Philip G. Haddad filed a pro se Complaint, which the Court
interprets as alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Doc. No. 1. Haddad brings these claims against private actors
and state officials, and seeks $2.9 million in damages. The
various Defendants named in the Complaint have filed three
motions to dismiss. Doc. No. 21, 27, 35.
facts are drawn from the Complaint. On April 12, 2012, Haddad
went to a privately-owned building at 1000 Washington Street
in Boston, Massachusetts, to visit the office of the
Massachusetts Division of Insurance. Doc. No. 1 at ¶
¶ 13, 23. His purpose in visiting the building was to
" inquire as to the status of the content in
correspondence previously forwarded to the Division of
Insurance." Id. at ¶ 23.
clearing building security, Haddad proceeded to the eleventh
floor to await the opening of the Division of Insurance.
Id. at ¶ 13. Shortly thereafter, Defendant
Martine Florestal of Securitas Security Services, Inc.
(" Securitas" ), informed Haddad that he had to
leave the building due to an outstanding Complaint and Order
against him that was issued by the Massachusetts Division of
Professional Licensure. Id. at ¶ 14. Haddad
disputed the existence of such an Order and declined to
leave, politely. Id. at ¶ 15. Florestal advised
Haddad that she would contact the Massachusetts State Police
if he did not leave the premises. Id.
thereafter, Defendant Massachusetts State Trooper Sean Newman
appeared and advised Haddad that he must leave the building
or face arrest. Id. at ¶ 16-17. Haddad agreed
to leave, and Newman escorted him out of the building.
Id. at ¶ 18. While doing so, seven Boston
Police Officer approached Haddad, hands on their holstered
weapons, and one officer stated that they were responding to
a 911 call that reported " Haddad was in the building,
was a threat to the lives of employees in the building, [and]
was known to carry a weapon." Id. at ¶ 19.
The authorities continued to escort Haddad from the building
and a Boston Police Officer conducted a frisk search of
Haddad with Haddad's consent, but found no weapon.
Id. at ¶ 22. No excess force is alleged.
To survive a motion to dismiss [under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)],
a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting
Bell A. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127
S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). " The plausibility
standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,'
but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). For purposes of the
Defendants' motions to dismiss, the Court " must
take the allegations in the complaint as true and must make
all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff."
Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993).