United States District Court, D. Massachusetts
For Gaynell Williams, Jr., Plaintiff: Hector E. Pineiro, LEAD ATTORNEY, Robert A. Scott, Worcester, MA.
For FNU Bisceglia, Defendant: Wendy L. Quinn, City of Worcester Law Department, Worcester, MA.
For Gary Gemme, City of Worcester, Defendants: Kevin M. Gould, Wendy L. Quinn, City of Worcester Law Department, Worcester, MA.
TIMOTHY S. HILLMAN, DISTRICT JUDGE.
Nature of the Case
Gaynell Williams, Jr. (" Williams" or " Plaintiff" ) filed suit against Officer Bisceglia (" Officer Bisceglia" ), Chief of Police Gary J. Gemme (" Chief Gemme" ) and the City of Worcester (" City" ) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging claims for " unreasonable" arrest and wrongful incarceration (Count I), false arrest (Count II), and negligence pursuant to the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, Mass.Gen.L. ch. 258 (" MTCA" )(Count III). More specifically, he alleges that Officer Bisceglia requested that he be arrested in North Carolina on a fugitive warrant for a crime committed five years earlier in the City by a " Gaynell Williams" with a different date of birth and social security number. He further alleges that he was in fact arrested, extradited (voluntarily) and incarcerated for approximately four months before evidence was obtained that established he could not have committed the crime charged. This Order addresses Plaintiff's Motion, Memorandum Included, For Leave To File Second Amended Complaint, Adding No Additional Parties Or. Claims [Fed.R.Civ. 15(a)(2)] (Docket No. 8). For the reasons set forth below, that motion is allowed, in part, and denied, in part. This Order also addresses Brian Bisceglia's Motion To Dismiss (Docket No. 10) and Gary Gemme and City of Worcester's Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 12). For the reasons set forth below, Officer Bisceglia's motion is denied and the City's and Chief Gemme's motion is allowed.
The Motions To Dismiss
Standard of Review
In a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the Court " must assume the truth of all well-plead[ed] facts and give the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences therefrom." Ruiz v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., 496 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Rogan v. Menino, 175 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 1999)). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider materials attached to or incorporated by reference in the complaint, or that are a part of the pleading itself. Trans--Spec Truck Serv. v. Caterpillar, 524 F.3d 315, 321 (1st Cir. 2008). To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must state a claim that is plausible on its face. Bell A. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). That is, " [f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, ... on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. at 555 (citations omitted). However, the Court need not consider " bald assertions [or] unsupportable conclusions." Doyle v. Hasbro, Inc., 103 F.3d 186, 190 (1st Cir. 1996). " The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Dismissal is appropriate if plaintiff's well-pleaded facts do not " possess enough heft to show that plaintiff is ...