United States District Court, D. Massachusetts
INDIRA TALWANI, District Judge.
Plaintiff Colleen Graham ("Graham") seeks an order remanding this case to state court on the ground that Defendant Santander Consumer USA, Inc. ("Santander") removed the case without the consent or joinder of Defendant Central Motors, Inc. ("Central Motors"). Because Central motors did not consent to or join in removal, Graham's Motion to Remand to State Court [#8] is ALLOWED.
Graham alleges that she entered into a financing agreement with Central Motors related to the purchase of a 2012 Wrangler. Compl. ¶ 4. According to Graham, Central Motors abused her inexperience and induced her to enter into a loan with exploitative terms, including a 21% interest rate and a financing charge of $19, 978.64 on a principal of $25, 547.00. Id . ¶¶ 7-8. Graham further alleges that Central Motors failed to make all required disclosures regarding material terms of the agreement. Id . ¶ 15. Central Motors subsequently transferred its interest in the agreement to Santander. Id . ¶ 10.
B. Procedural History
Graham filed a complaint in Essex County Superior Court. She stated claims against Central Motors for violation of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq., as well as various state laws. Compl. ¶¶ 12-29. Against Santander, Graham brought claims of assignee liability for Central Motor's alleged Truth in Lending Act violation as well as Central Motor's purported failure to receive the required license to operate a motor vehicle sales financing company. Id . ¶¶ 30-37.
Graham served Santander with a summons on July 2, 2014, and Central Motors with a summons on July 11, 2014. See Mem. Sup. Pl.'s Mot. Remand Exs. A-B [#8]. On July 25, 2014, Central Motors filed its Answer in state court. See State Ct. Record, 10-13 [#9-1]. On July 29, 2014, Santander removed the case to federal court. See Notice Removal [#1]. The notice of removal stated that the federal court had original jurisdiction over Graham's federal law claims. Id . ¶¶ 1-2. Santander did not indicate that Central Motors joined in or consented to the removal. Central Motors did not file it own notice of removal within thirty days of receiving service of the complaint.
On August 27, 2014, Graham timely filed a motion to remand to state court and requested that the court award her attorney's fees incurred as a result of the improper removal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Graham argued that remand was necessary because the notice of removal failed to properly join all defendants. See id. § 1446(b)(2)(a).
When a civil action is removed on the ground that the federal court has original jurisdiction over claims therein, "all defendants who have been properly joined and served must join in or consent to the removal of the action." Id .; see also id. § 1441(a) (providing for removal based on federal question jurisdiction). The failure of all defendants to consent to or join in removal makes remand appropriate. See, e.g., Esposito v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 590 F.3d 72, 76 (1st Cir. 2009).
Santander argues that § 1446(b)(2)(a)'s joinder requirement does not control this case, which is properly governed by 28 U.S.C. § ...