United States District Court, D. Massachusetts
Charles Isler, Petitioner, Pro se, AYER, MA.
For Jeffrey Grondolsky, Respondent: Marissa Caylor, United States Attorney's Office, Boston, MA.
Judith Gail Dein, U.S. Magistrate Judge.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND/OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Petitioner, Charles Isler (" Isler" or " Petitioner" ), is presently incarcerated at the Federal Medical Center in Devens, Massachusetts (" FMC-Devens" ), where he is serving a 180-month sentence for drug related charges. He has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pro se pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Docket No. 1) against the Warden of FMC-Devens, Jeffrey Grondolsky (" Respondent" ), challenging his security classification as a " sex offender" by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (" BOP" ). Isler claims that this classification violates his constitutional Due Process rights because he has never been convicted of a sex-related crime.
This matter is presently before the Court on the " Respondent Jeffrey Grondolsky's Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment" (Docket No. 10), by which the Respondent is seeking dismissal, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and 56, of the habeas petition for failure to state a claim. The Respondent contends that dismissal is warranted because the Petitioner has no constitutional right to any specific security classification while incarcerated, and the Petitioner has failed to establish that the BOP has acted arbitrarily or irrationally. For the reasons detailed herein, this court agrees that the BOP's classification of Isler as a " sex offender" for security purposes was permissible and not arbitrary or irrational. Accordingly, this court recommends to the District Judge to whom this case is assigned that the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 10) be ALLOWED.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
When ruling on a motion to dismiss brought under Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6), the court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts and give the
plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences.
See Cooperman v. Individual, Inc., 171 F.3d 43, 46 (1st Cir. 1999). Where, as here, the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, this court construes his allegations liberally.
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be liberally construed). " Ordinarily, a court may not consider any documents that are outside of the complaint, or not expressly incorporated therein, unless the motion is converted into one for summary judgment."
Alt. Energy Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993)). " There is, however, a narrow exception 'for documents the authenticity of which are not disputed by the parties; for official public records; for documents central to plaintiff['s] claim; or for documents sufficiently referred to in the ...